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Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition 
Mirna Mneimneh 
ABSTRACT  
Iraqi Federalism: Modeling Democratic Transition 
This thesis analyzes democratization models for deeply divided society 
undergoing political transition.  It takes the federalization and 
consociationalization strategies as implemented in Iraq as a case study. A 
comparative analysis is further conducted in order to evaluate the Iraqi 
governing experience in contrast to alternative power-sharing strategies for 
ethno sectarian divided societies. 
 The thesis provides an assessment of the various power-sharing models and 
entertains the viability of majoritarian pluralism. It focuses on each model 
success in the attainment of four major transitional indicators: security, 
ethnic/sectarian pluralism, national cohesion, and social equity.  These four 
transitional indicators are further evaluated in their foreign policy 
implications relevant to three neighboring countries: Iran, Syria and Turkey. 
The thesis demonstrates the viability and limitations of power sharing 
models for ethnically divided countries undergoing democratic transitions. 
 
Keywords:  
Federalism, Iraq, Security, Distribution of Wealth, Ethnicity, Sectarianism, 
Social Equity, Consociationalism, U.S. Operation Save Face.  
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Chapter One 
Democratic Transitional Models for Divided Societies 
 
Ever since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and 
the Baath regime (which has lasted until this day), a real and stable future for Iraq still 
seems blurry. The Iraqi experience has led to various disputes on which governing 
model would be the best for the stability of the country. The change of the authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world has been a real challenge for the region and the way to 
democracy has yet to be properly paved. 
 
This research paper aims to analyze U.S. democratization of Iraq and its instated federal 
model. It examines various proposed power-sharing models that have been advanced as 
suitable for ethnically and religiously divided societies such as Iraq. These models have 
been vigorously debated in Iraq since 2003, these debates focused on the ability of each 
model to address four major challenges: ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, distribution 
of wealth, and security. Other factors affecting the agendas of the various domestic 
groups will also be considered in analyzing a suitable power sharing governing model.  
The paper examines Iraq’s political culture, its historic identity crisis, and ultimately its 
strive for achieving ethnic consensus and political stability.  
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Scholars have examined transitional democratic models to authoritarian rules. This 
study considers four significant determinants of successful transition: security, ethnic 
consensus, equitable distribution of wealth, and common nationalism. It highlights the 
interrelations between these variables in their influence on transition.   For instance, it 
shows how the issue of governance is significantly associated with the attainment of 
stability especially in deeply divided societies who have never experienced democratic 
governance.  
 
Kaper and Smith demonstrate that the major threat to democratic transition in divided 
society lies in the momentum where ―cultural diversity or pluralism automatically 
imposes the strictest necessity for domination for one the cultural sections. It excludes 
the possibility of a consensus… and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group 
relationships‖ (Kaper and Smith 1969, 14). Such a dynamic, has since created an 
ongoing ethnic instabilities during transitions where the stakes of attaining equity and 
achieving common national identity become the focal points of disputes.   
 
Middle Eastern states are among the remaining authoritarian regimes that have stood 
resilient to democratic global waves while maintaining a tradition of political repression 
against opposition.  Perhaps, the lack of a transitional road map to the satisfaction of the 
various ethnic and sectarian groups in the Middle East can be held responsible for 
exceptional capacity of the authoritarian governments to easily abort efforts for 
democratic change. Diamond highlighted the lack of democracies in the Arab world, ― 
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by then, a critical mass of democracies have existed in every major world region save 
one – the Middle East‖ ( Diamond 2010, 2). 
 
Lebanon is among the very few exceptions where consociationalism has given its 
sectarian groups diversified power to balance against potential authoritarian rules. 
Various scholars have suggested that perhaps the Lebanese and current Iraqi form of 
governance can very well be the suitable governing power-sharing model for ethnically 
divided or sectarian states. Diamond is one of the believers of this notion: ―Iraq and 
Lebanon- for all their fractious, polarized divisions – are the two Arab countries closest 
to full electoral democracy today‖ (Diamond 2010, 4)  
 
This is despite the fact that the Iraqi experience, and now Libya’s, transition is brought 
by external military intervention and has been largely viewed with suspicions The 
federal governing model of Iraq has been assessed as an ingredient for ethnic division 
and colonial influence. Still, experts and scholars continue to debate best suitable 
governing model solution for the Iraq and forecast the best arrangement in which the 
country can achieve stability and move towards a more democratic regime. 
 
Arendt Liphart has long established that ―political culture and social structure are 
empirically related to political stability‖. (Liphart 1969, 208) Thus the study of stability 
in any country must take into account both political culture and social structure of the 
country as the main factors responsible for enhancing political stability. In the case of 
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Iraq, it is evident that consensus among ethnic groups played a major role in bringing a 
false sense of stability to the country, despite Saddam Hussein’s oppression of their 
political culture.  
 
It is very important to note that Iraq is an ethnically divided country and each group has 
its own aspirations and vision of how Iraq’s regime should be set up. Whether 
federalism, externally imposed or internally attained, is a suitable form of governance 
for a deeply divided society remains to be seen. The U.S. sponsored federalism in Iraq is 
still facing the major challenge of achieving stability in Iraq.  
 
Another aim of this paper is to analyze U.S. democratization of Iraq and its instated 
federal model. It examines how and under what circumstances can be proposed power-
sharing models for ethnically and sectarian divided societies such as Iraq achieve 
democratic transitions. Some of these models have been vigorously debated in Iraq 
since 2003, which focused on the ability to address four major challenges: 
ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, distribution of wealth, and security. The following 
sections examine Iraq’s political culture, its historic identity crisis, and ultimately it’s 
striving to achieve ethnic consensus and political stability.  External factor implicating 
domestic agendas of the various groups will also be considered in analyzing suitable 
power sharing governing model. Special attention will given to the suitability of the 
Lebanese Consociational model as it provides a comparative perspective, having both 
countries sharing similar cultural and political challenges.  
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The thesis is divided into five chapters. Starting with this chapter as an introduction, 
Chapter two examines the various theories that have taken up the issues of power 
sharing formulations in divided countries. Particularly, it addresses three most important 
power-sharing theories: Federalism, Consociationalism, and Majoritarian-Secularism. 
Each theoretical view will be assessed in light of the four major challenges: security, 
distribution of wealth, ethnicity/sectarianism, and nationalism. The ultimate objective is 
to reveal the successes and the shortcomings of each of the three theories in addressing 
key challenges that confront governance in divided society undergoing democratic 
transformation and state building.  
 
Chapter three introduces a brief background of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
proposed power-sharing models, the emerging external interventions that exacerbated 
domestic groups’ grievances, and the experiences of power.Then, imposition of the U.S. 
sponsored federal model of power sharing in Iraq. It first highlights the major 
milestones beginning with the Iraqi Interim Government, Elections, Iraqi Constitution, 
and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq. The study of these key developments in 
Iraq provides circumstantial conditions upon which federal experience in Iraq was 
established. The achievements and failure of the imposed federal governing model is 
later assessed in light of the major challenges as previously provided.  
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Chapter four examines international relations of the various groups and their impact  on 
the stabilization of Iraq. The neighboring countries’ impact and relations with different 
ethnic groups are one of the most important factors in any study of power-sharing 
models. This chapter relates the Iraqi study to the three previously debated governing 
models in any powers-sharing governing model. Whether an alternative governing 
model, such as that of Lebanese Consociationalism may provide a better alternative to 
that of ethno-sectarian federalism in overcoming the challenges of a divided Iraqi 
society is assessed. The foreign policies adopted by Iran, Syria, Turkey, and the US 
have a direct influence on the various domestic groups in Iraq, whose cooperation is 
crucial to the implementation of a stable federal state in country.  
 
Finally, chapter five provides conclusionary remarks that reflect the lessons learned 
from the Iraqi democratization experience amid deep internal division and external 
interventions. This examination provides insights as to how the Arab region undergoing 
deeply rooted transformation may need to undertake suitable governing models that 
serve democratic transition away from authoritarian rules. This model can achieve 
stability through providing ethnic/sectarian plurality, equity, and common national 
identity. 
 
Such revelations can prove instrumental for transitional democracy in any state which 
has been dictated by tyrants for a long time. It will highlight the set-backs of gun barrel 
use in the democratization process in any multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian society. 
Moreover, it will stress on the underlying fears of any heterogeneous society which is 
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seeking to become a democracy. At the end, a suitable governing model revealed from 
comparative experience, particularly that of Iraq, will be suggestive in the instigation of 
democratic transitions and reforms. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Imposed Democracy for Divided Society 
 
This chapter examines the relevant literature. It focuses on scholars that have taken 
interest in the issues of power sharing formulations in divided countries. It will stress 
the three most widely accepted models of power: Federalism, Consociationalism, and 
Majoritarian-Secularism. These models will be examined in light of the four major 
variables which are: security, distribution of wealth, ethnicity/sectarianism, and 
nationalism. The ultimate objective is to reveal the successes and the shortcomings of 
each of the three theories in addressing key challenges that confront governing in 
divided society undergoing democratic transformation and state building.  
 
James Kurth considers that the experiences of West Germany and Japan ―certainly 
demonstrate that military conquest and occupation can bring about successful 
democratization, ―yet he stresses that every country or region has its own traits and 
cultural specifications‖(Kurth 2005,207). However, we cannot apply these experiences 
to a different context especially in multi-ethnic societies. The homogeneity of both West 
Germany and Japan may have contributed to the success of democratization. Kurth goes 
on to explain the three major differences which might render to the success of military 
intervention and the imposition of democracies. The three important factors he discusses 
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are: a prior liberal experience, a greater foreign threat and an ethnically homogenous 
population. (Kurth 2005, 308-309)  
 
The three variables Kurth mentions by do not apply to the Iraqi experience since the 
foreign threats may appeal to the different ethnic groups differently and its society is 
divided upon ethnic lines. Thus he concludes that ―one can have an Iraq without a 
democracy or democracy without Iraq but not both‖(Kurth 2005, 310).  
 
However, this study rejects Kurth’s claim that Iraq cannot become a democratic country 
due to its cultural disposition. Yet as we have situated this study earlier, Kurth 
reconfirms our variables though in a different terminology. He speaks of security, 
nationalism, ethnic and sectarian divides. The additional variable taken into perspective 
for the achievement of democracy is distribution of wealth.  
 
The study will now move to the theoretical frameworks of the three power-sharing 
models which are Federalism, Consociational Democracy, and majority/secular rule as 
to reveal how each of these models addresses the challenges of stability, consensus, 
equity, and common identity in a divided society.  
 
2.2Non-Majoritarian Models: Federalism vs. Consociationalism 
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Ardent Lijphart is among the most prominent thinkers regarding the theories of 
federalism and Consociational democracies. Lijphart gives a detailed account of the 
variables of the theory of federalism tracing the origins of federalism to political 
integration.  
 
― Federation was labeled earlier as a particular form of integration, but according to 
Deutsch’s terminology it should be referred to as a special type of amalgamation, 
because the former merger into a sovereign state‖ ( Lijphart 1971,  3). The question he 
is trying to answer is how does a federation remain integrated? The variable in this 
study of federal theory is nationalism. Nationalism in directly related to community’s 
integration under one state especially in a deeply divided society. Lijphart concentrates 
on the ―the relationship between cultural homogeneity and political integration‖ 
(Lijphart 1971, 4) Lijphart goes on to define nationality by saying it implies ― common 
values, thoughts, or feelings and a common attachment to symbols—in other words , a 
common culture‖ (Liphart 1971, 4). The lesson to take from this analysis is that 
nationalism can be understood as being synonymous to culture in this context. 
 
Moreover, Lijphart stresses on how the international community has considered a 
common culture to be fundamental for any democratic country. ― The basis of a union 
cannot be the desire for economic advantages, protection against danger, or peace‖ 
(Lijphart 1971, 5) Here he explains Deutsch’s perspective on the importance of culture 
for the unification of one nation. Yet he goes on to explain the loopholes in this theory 
by showing how Etzioni counters Deutsche’s argument. As Etzioni states ―sharing 
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culture is not required for unification, nor does the lack of a shared culture prevent it; it 
simply has little effect on political unification.‖ (Lijphart 1971, 7)  
 
Lijphart’s analysis of the two counter arguments states that ―the causes and conditions 
of federation do not constitute the primary focus of studies of federalism‖ (Lijphart 
1971, 8). Liphart continues to emphasize Riker’s analysis of federalism by stating that 
―there are two necessary conditions for the striking of a ―federal bargain‖: a desire to 
expand territorial control and external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity‖ 
(Lijphart 1971, 8). Here the second variable for federalism is security. 
 
In Lijphart’s comparison of federal and consociational democracies, he highlights the 
similarities and differences of both governing models and the feasibility of their 
intersection. It is not necessary for a federal state to be consociational or vice versa. He 
starts by considering that ―federalism and Consociationalism do not coincide, although 
they do overlap to an important extent if we add a few characteristics to the concept of 
federalism, we arrive at the concept of Consociationalism‖ (Liphart 1985, 3). 
 
The counter argument is also true of federalism. The common grounds of both theories 
undermine majoritarian democracy. The argument starts by defining the two concepts. 
Consequently Liphart points out that ―Consociational democracy violates the principle 
of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from normative democratic theory‖ 
(Lijphart 1969, 214).  
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Before going into a detailed account of the features of Consociational democracy and 
compare it with federalism a consideration of the theoretical background of 
Consociationalism is necessary. ―Consociational democracy means government by elite 
cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy‖(Lijphart 1969, 216). Hence, the elite should have the ability to understand 
and contain the different ethnic or sectarian aspirations within their communities. 
Liphart has also defined the different terms he used and pinpointed the important 
elements for the stability of Consociational democracies. ―The essential characteristic of 
Consociational democracy in not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the 
deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilize their system‖ (Lijphart 1969, 213).  
 
Here the question which poses itself is what can bring the elite cartel to work together in 
order to sustain the stability of the country in light of its diversity. Liphart attributes the 
causes behind it to three conducive characteristics which are the existence of external 
threats, balance of power among subcultures, and the preservation of an equilibrium 
within the subcultures which makes the decision making apparatus easier to attain. 
(Lijphart 1969, 217-219) These mark the variables this paper is studying especially 
security on the internal and external level and the distribution of wealth which would 
help in the balancing of power among the subcultures when the country is relatively rich 
with natural wealth.  
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Liphart does not stop at defining the fundamentals of Consociational democracy. In a 
subsequent study, he goes on to identify the different attributes of it. Thus he pursued 
his study of the notion of Consociational democracy and also considered it ―can be 
defined in terms of two primary attributes – grand coalition and segmental autonomy – 
and two secondary characteristics – proportionality and minority veto ― (Lijphart 1985, 
4). The key element here is power sharing since Consociationalism is rooted in deeply 
divided societies whether they are ethnic or sectarian. This form of power sharing 
makes sure those minorities’ rights are preserved. 
 
In a review of the Lebanese Consociational model, Michael Hudson refers to the main 
two scholars of this theory which are Ardent Lijphart and Eric Nordlinger. In addition to 
the above mentioned conditions that Ardent set for the Consociational model to work, 
Nordlinger also proposed six conflict-regulating practices which are ―1. Stable coalition, 
2.Proportionality, 3.Depolictization, 4.Mutual Veto, 5.Compromise, 6. Concessions by 
the stronger to the weaker‖( Hudson 1976, 113). He concludes that given these 
conditions of Consociationalism are met; the stability of the country should be 
guaranteed.  
 
Yet, Lebanon is a big example of how it has failed to abide by these guidelines since the 
eruption of civil war. He continues to consider the main difficulty of this theory to be 
―intrinsically too static to accommodate the enormous social and political forces 
unleashed by social mobilization‖ (Hudson 1976, 113).  In short, Hudson blames the 
confessional system in itself as the root of the problem.  
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Federalism ― can also be defined in terms of primary and secondary principles. The 
primary federal characteristic is a guaranteed division of power between central and 
regional governments‖ (Liphart 1985, 4). As for the secondary characteristics he 
divided them into five component units which are: 
 
―(1) a written constitution which specifies the division of power and guarantees to both 
the central and the regional governments that their allotted powers cannot be taken 
away; (2) a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large 
and the other the component units of the federations; (3) over-representation of the 
smaller component units in the federal chamber of the bicameral legislature; (4) the 
right of the component units to be involved in the process of amending the federal 
constitution and to change their own constitutions unilaterally; and (5) decentralized 
government, that is the regional governments’ share of power in a federation is 
relatively large compared with that of regional governments in unitary states.‖ (Liphart 
1985, 4-5) 
 
Lijphart explains how Consociational democracies can be federal and vice versa. 
Consociational democracies must thus follow the primary and secondary characteristics 
of the federation from the central-regional division of power, internal constitutional 
autonomy, decentralization, written constitution, bicameralism and minority 
representation. (Liphart 1985, 5)  
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If a federal state seeks to become a Consociational federal democracy, then there are 
additional rules to be taken into consideration. To start with, a federal state is not 
necessarily a democracy. Thus the rule is that ― the federation must be a democracy‖ 
(Liphart 1985, 5). Lijphart goes on to tackle the plurality of the society which is an 
important ingredient in the Maronite marriage between Consociational and federal 
democracy. Moreover, all the principles of the primary and secondary attributes should 
be applied. The divides of the component units should be based on the ethnic or 
sectarian divides of the country in a geographical way. Ethnicity/sectarianism can thus 
be seen to be at the heart of the concept of Consociationalism. 
 
Brian Berry is one of the major critics of this theory especially in the case of Nothern 
Ireland where he recommends ― cooperation without cooptation‖ (Liphart 2008, 76) 
meaning that both the majority and the minority ethnic or sectarian groups of a country 
promise to behave  moderately. He presupposes that this would be an ethical form of 
conduct when it comes to politics. However, Liphart points out the weakness of this 
argument by considering that ― this is a primitive solution to ethnic tensions and 
extremism, and it is naïve to expect minorities condemned to permanent opposition to 
remain loyal, moderate, and constructive. Barry’s suggestion therefore cannot be – and 
in practice, has not been- a serious alternative to power sharing‖(Liphart 2008, 77). 
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Similarly, Donald Horowitz has developed Berry’s concept by devising ― a method to 
induce moderation called ―alternative vote‖ or ―instant run off‖‖ (Liphart 2008, 77). 
This method would supposedly encourage the election of moderate representatives.  
 
Liphart tries to apply these methods on the Iraqi case. Accordingly, he considered that ― 
Horowitz’s model would generate a body consisting mainly of the Shi’ite majority, with 
the proviso that most of these representatives would be chosen in such a way that they 
would be sympathetic to the interests of the Sunni and Kurdish minority‖ (Liphart 2008, 
77). As Liphart notes, such a formula would only lead to failure since the security of the 
minorities has not been addressed properly. ―In sum, power sharing has proven to be the 
only democratic model that appears to have much chance of being adopted in divided 
societies‖(Lijphart 2008, 77) 
 
Another power-sharing theory related to this study is federalism. Federalism is a very 
old notion though it does not imply that a federal state has to be democratic. Dimitrious 
Karmis and Wayne Norman defined federalism as ―an arrangement in which two or 
more self-governing communities share the same political space‖ (Karimis and Norman 
2005, 3). They trace back the question of why people choose federalism to the fact that 
―it gives a self-governing political community the best of both worlds: the advantages of 
being a relatively small, homogenous polity along with the advantages of being part of a 
stronger, more secure larger state or alliance; while at the same time avoiding some of 
the worst disadvantages of being either too small or too large‖ (Karimis and Norman 
2005, 8).  
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They go on to spell out what they consider to be the four pillars of federalism. These 
are:  the division of power, representation in central institutions, the integration of 
markets and legal systems, and the amending formula or provisions for secession. 
(Karimis and Norman 2005, 14). These four elements mark the most important aspects 
of federalism in both uninational and multinational countries, yet the particulars differ. 
 
John Stuart Mill outlines the three necessary predispositions of federalism. ―The first is 
that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations‖ 
(Mill 1861). By mutual sympathy he means race, religion, language, political 
institutions and identity.  
 
The second condition is ―separate states be nor so powerful as to be able to rely for 
protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength and the third 
condition is ―that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several 
contracting states‖. (Mill 1861) 
 
Franz Neumann briefly summarizes the function of federalism as follows:  
― 1. Presidential or parliamentary democracy 
2. Separation of power (checks and balances) 
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3. The party system; 
And the social and economic factors are these: 
1. The extent of the pluralistic structure of society 
2. The urban-rural ratio 
3. The degree of concentration of economic power‖ (Karimis and Norman 2005, 
208) 
 
Richard Ballamy and Dario Castiglione considered that ― the federal model seemed 
better adapted to conditions of cultural and linguistic diversity, or situations where for 
either historical or geographical reasons there was no great homogeneity within the 
state‖ (Karimis and Norman 2005, 294).  They also trace back the origin or federalism 
and its value. Consequently, they considered that federalism was developed as a form of 
checks and balances as Neumann also stressed. 
 
In a comparison by Daniel Elazar between federalism and Consociational regimes, he 
considered that ― the formal is usually presented as quite rigid while the latter is 
presented as extraordinarily flexible‖(Elazar 1985, 19). Moreover, he goes on to 
pinpoint the mistakes several scholars of international affairs have made when trying to 
compare the two power sharing models. A very important critique is of those who 
differentiate between unity and diversity. ― Unity should be contrasted disunity and 
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diversity with homogeneity, emphasizing the political dimensions and implications of 
each‖(Elazar 1985, 23). 
 
 Scholars are usually interested in the means federalism provides to attain the larger 
ends such as ― political unification, democracy, popular self-government, the 
accommodation of diversity and so on‖(Elazar 1985, 28). While on the other hand, 
Consociationalism emancipates out of the need to reach a compromise among the 
different camps since ―if they had their way, would seek domination or elimination of 
each other but which have come to recognize that the internal balance of power in the 
polity does not permit that to happen. Hence such regimes are means of reconciliation 
but cannot be ends in and of themselves‖ (Elazar 1985,28).  
 
After a thorough study of federalism and Consociational regimes, Elazar concludes that 
―federalism is the form of a polity while Consociationalism refers to a polity’s regime‖ 
(Elazar 1985, 29). By polity he meant the institutions and constitution of the regime 
where he wraps up by mentioning that no federal regimes have given on it except in the 
cases of an external power’s invasion. Moreover, it is important to note that change does 
in fact happen within the federal system since it is not a static governing model unlike 
the Consociational model which was earlier described as ―static‖ by Hudson. In addition 
to these two points he reflects on the inclination of federal Consociational regimes to 
survive longer than just Consociational ones (Elazar 1985, 29-30). In sum 
―Consociationalism appears to be a relatively transient regime arrangement. Indeed, the 
classic consociations seem to last for about two generations before giving way to some 
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other form of regime, which, coincidentally or not, is about the length of time that a 
majority party maintains its majority coalition intact in two party systems‖ (Elazar 
1985, 31).  
 
2.3Majoritarian Democratic Model 
 
In a comparison between Majoritarian Regimes and power-sharing regimes, Lijphart 
highlights the major difference between the two theories where by ―the former seek to 
concentrate power as much as possible in the hands of the majority, whereas the latter 
try to include as many citizens as possible in the sharing of power‖ (Lijphart 2008, 126). 
Majoritarians’ reasoning behind this basic attribute of sharing model lies in their belief 
that minorities power might prevail or sharing the power with them might lead to 
political and institutional deadlocks. As quoted by Liphart, Alexander Hamilton stressed 
by giving minorities any kind of power over the majority might lead to ― tedious delays; 
continual negotiations and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good‖. 
(Lijphart 2008, 127) 
 
Liphart states the gap between the theoretical framework and practice of it since 
democracies ―almost uniformly deviate from majoritarian decision-making rules, to 
adopt mechanisms more likely to rally a broad consensus‖(Lijphart 2008, 111). There 
are two reasons behind this split; to start with, newly born democracies need to 
consensus democracy ―because they suffer from more serious internal cleavages and 
face more sensitive and divisive issues‖(Lijphart 2008, 111). Moreover, associating 
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democracy with majority rule is so prevalent which comprises a major impediment to 
any consideration of consensus. He notes that ― democratization means the drafting of 
democratic constitutions, and the careful drafting of a new or improved constitution 
starts badly if it takes the majoritarian definition of democracy as its only point of 
departure‖ (Lijphart 2008, 111).  
 
Consequently, majoritarian rule does not take minorities rights into perspective by 
considering that the new democracies will be formed in homogenous environments. 
This bears on four variables for a newly-established democracy especially when it 
comes to nationhood and security. By dismissing the needs of the minorities, 
insecurities regarding their status will inevitably arise as in the case of Iraq. By 
concentrating power in the hands of the majority, this kind of governance does not give 
any kind of leverages to the other various groups, whether they were ethnic or sectarian, 
and only protects the interests of the majorities.  
 
According to Roland Pennock’s conception of democracy, ―rule by the majority is often 
alleged to be the very essence of democracy‖.(Pennock 1979, 370) This has been 
refuted by Robert Dahl where he considered that ― no one has ever advocated, and no 
one except its enemies has ever defined democracy to mean that a majority would or 
should do anything it felt an impulse to do. Every advocate of democracy … and every 
friendly definition of it, includes the idea of restraints on majorities‖(Dahl 167, 36 ).   
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There is a general assumption that some kind of constraint will be put on the majority 
once they are in rule, Dahl goes on to explain the form of these constraints which are: 
―(1) ethical and cultural constraints, primarily operative at the level of the individual 
consciences, (2) social checks and balances, or (3) legal and constitutional 
constraints‖(Dahl 1956, 36). These constraints are either legally enforced, by the 
legislative, executive, or judicial or, socially imposed by the local norms and practices. 
 
But this argument is fallacious. If these constraints are to be applied formally, the 
majority are the ones who will control this application. This is due to the fact that they 
are the ones employed in the different governmental bodies. On the other hand, if the 
constraints are to be enforced via social checks and boundaries, these checks will 
depend only on the very same individuals’ ethics, therefore, the majority’s code of 
conduct. But it is this very standard which is called into question.  
 
Lijphart explores this avenue by concluding that ―any limits the majority poses upon 
itself can also be removed by it‖ (Lijphart 2008, 113). Moreover, he considers that ―it is 
wrong and dangerous to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that majority rule is the only or 
the only legitimate form of democracy‖ (Liphart 2008, 114). 
 
Lijphart goes into more details regarding majority rule in practice. It is very important 
to pinpoint the characteristics of the majoritarian regime and how the power distribution 
would be done. To start with, majority rule means the concentration of power in the 
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hands of one major group. This group should be made up of essentially one political 
party which dominates the legislature and the cabinet. Consequently, ― the legislature 
should obviously be unicameral in order to ensure that there is only one clear majority, 
that is, in order to avoid the possibility of competing majorities that may occur in two 
chambers‖(Liphart 2008, 115). As for the government, its system should be unitary and 
centralized. In this case, the constitution should not be engineered in a way that impedes 
the work and legislations of this majority in any geographical or institutional way. 
Finally, any amendment to the constitution can be exercised by a simple majority.  
 
These are the set rules for majoritarian regimes to succeed. Liphart added to them more 
characteristics which might be vital when taking an empirical perspective. A two party 
system which ―when two major parties dominate the party system, it is highly likely that 
one of them will emerge as the winning or majority even in elections‖(Liphart 2008, 
115). This system is further augmented by a plural form of elections ― to the extent that 
there is only one dominant cleavage, typically socio-economic or left-right division, in a 
country and its party system‖ (Liphart 2008,115). 
In conclusion, the three different governing theories which will be used in this study are 
Consociationalism, Federalism and Majoritarian. After this look at the literature of the 
theories, this paper will analyze the Iraqi case after the toppling of the Baath regime in 
light of the four variables under study and assessment of federalism in Iraq.  
 
  
24 
 
Chapter 3 
Iraq Case Study 
 
3.1 Prelude to the U.S. Invasion and the Ethnic Problem 
 
In this chapter, the Iraqi experience will be examined in detail. In 2003 the US led 
intervention caused the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s oppressive dictatorial regime. 
This necessitated a new governing model for the country. General consensus is that the 
federal model would be most suitable for the Iraq. The most relevant aspects for this 
study of the new federal governing model of Iraq are: The democratic elections of 2005, 
the Iraqi constitution, elections of 2009, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq and 
its repercussions, and the 2010 elections. Moreover, we will take a look at the federal 
set-up of Iraq as imposed by the United States in the past 8 years.  
 
While we study these important events that happened to Iraq, we will be critically 
analyzing the governing model imposed on this multi-ethnic country and its pros and 
cons. The four variables (security, ethnicity, nationalism and distribution of wealth) will 
be closely examined in regards to the events which have happened in Iraq.  
 
Toby Dodge considers that ― in the space of two years, because of the invasion and then 
state collapse, Iraq went from rogue, the first category of problematic state to the 
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second, collapsed‖ (Dodge 2005, 706). This study will test the feasibility of this theory 
in the following chapter by examining the different aspects of the Iraqi case. 
 
3.2The Baath’s Secular Model 
 
Before proceeding to the milestone that changed Iraq’s reality and discussing the 
different governing models, a brief look at the environment in which Saddam Hussein 
and the Baath regime were toppled in 2003 is in order.  
 
Throughout the history of the Iraqis, they have been divided upon different lines. Their 
identity was pretty much looked at from ―an individual’s regional background, family, 
clan, and tribal affiliations‖ (Sluglett 1991, 1411). The Sunnis have historically ruled 
Iraq since the Ottoman Empire. Though a minority, they have maintained their status in 
power since the Ottoman Empire, passing through the British Mandate, the Hashemite 
monarchy, and the Ba’ath regime.  
 
The Ba’ath came into power in 1958 until it was overthrown by the United States’ 
invasion of Iraq. Though when it first came into power, the Ba’ath regime presented 
itself as a secular party; yet the underlying Sunnis preference was at its core. According 
to Tripp, Al-Bakr the first president after the Coup, was ― imbued with a keen 
awareness of status distinctions between different lineages and clans among the Sunni 
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Arabs which he, along with the greater part of the officer corps, saw as distinct from and 
superior to the Shi’i Arabs and Kurds of Iraq‖ (Tripp 2000, 195). 
 
After the rise of Saddam Hussein to power in 1979, many changes were introduced to 
the regime. The security apparatus and the army were all loyal to Saddam, the top 
positions were held by Sunni Arabs with intimate connections to Saddam. As Tripp 
summarizes this period, ―obedience to Saddam Hussain and proximity to him were now 
to be the criteria for promotion and indeed for political- and sometimes actual- 
survival‖. (Tripp 2000, 223) 
 
The main difference between the two Ba’ath leaders was the way they conducted their 
rule. Thus instead of the Ba’ath party representing a secular, pan-Arab alternative to the 
Iraqis, it was used by Saddam Hussein to coerce power and manipulate the people the 
way he wanted. Therefore, the Baath was not a party that represented the Sunnis per se, 
since there were Sunnis who were repressed also by the party. 
 
The Ba’ath’s ―patronage was not confined to the clans of the Sunni Arabs north-west, 
although the commanding positions in the regime and the security services without 
exception went to men from such backgrounds‖ (Tripp 2000, 227).The power of 
Saddam Hussein was increasing by time. After he came to power he went into two wars. 
The two Gulf wars initiated by Saddam represented his power in both the party’s 
ideology and the region. Although a lot of Ba’athists have adhered to Saddam’s actions; 
27 
 
yet, these actions can be seen as the need for survival under such a strong tyrant’s will. 
It should not be assumed that the Ba’ath party was fully loyal to Saddam.  
 
3.3 U.S. Imposition of Ethnic Democracy 
 
U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 after trying to prove to the International community and to 
the Americans the threat of Saddam’s regime. The primary reason for the invasion of 
Iraq, according to the Bush administration, was its threat to the U.S. national security 
and Iraq’s production of chemical weapons. For Americans, ―United States attacked 
Iraq after a brief warning; it would be a preemptive strike, in this context, preventing 
Iraq from taking military action first.‖ (Carlise  2005, 68). Thus the invasion of Iraq was 
not based on concrete proof of these chemical weapons or on the assumption of an Iraqi 
attack on the U.S. Yet the invasion became a reality in March 2003 and the coalition 
forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. Saddam Hussein and his top officials were 
executed and the Ba’ath party was dismembered and ousted from any participation in 
the political life of Iraq. 
 
This had further implications on the Iraqi crisis. Iraq is going ―through a process of 
reconstruction as the Shi’ites are being empowered and the Kurds are reentering the 
political process.‖ (Bahgat 2005, 102) Nevertheless, the harsher reality is the 
insurgency, which is threatening all ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq. Most 
prominently, al-Qaeda has managed to infuse itself within the Sunni Iraqis as their 
alternative in the struggle against American intervention. Bymann gives an account on 
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how the invasion has helped Al-Qaeda. In his account, he considers that ―the Iraqi 
invasion has inspired a new generation of young Muslims around the world. The War 
outraged Muslim militants, many of whom embraced bin Laden’s form of violence.‖ 
(Bymann 2007, 43)  
 
According to Mohammedi and Al-Kaderi, the neo conservatives have been on 
advocating war on Iraq prior September 11. They claim that ―neo-conservative 
officials—have been arguing for some time that Saddam Hussein’s regime needs to be 
toppled‖. (Mohammedi and Alkaderi  2002, 3). The toppling of the Ba’ath regime is 
thus a blow in the face of its leaders and followers. Moreover, it has weakened the 
Sunni sect who has been the historical figures of power in Iraq. The Sunnis and 
especially the followers of the Ba’ath regime opposed immensely the issue of military 
intervention, which the neo-conservatives saw as the only possible solution for Iraq. 
Neo-cons have been the promoters of the military actions in Iraq since the 1991 Gulf 
war. (Mohammedi and Alkaderi 2002, 3) 
 
The neo-conservatives believe that ―America should use its military power to reshape 
the world to suit its interest‖ (Mearsheimer 2005, 2). The use of military power has been 
directed towards the heart of the Sunni rule; thus weakening their position in the country 
and the instigating the rise of different religious realities which have long been 
oppressed. Moreover, according to the neo-conservative logic, the war on Iraq would 
help in ―bandwagoning‖ other rivals even allies in this case. On the other hand, the 
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realists believed that the United States would have to double their efforts in the region 
after the preemptive war on Iraq. (Mearsheimer 2005, 2)  
 
Mearsheimer has elaborated on this point and tried to prove that the war has been 
unnecessary on Iraq especially using the logic Bush has used to initiate the war. He did 
not accept the notion of preventive war since there was no threat to begin with. He goes 
on to say that ―Saddam thus has no incentive to use chemical or nuclear weapons 
against the United States and its allies – unless his survival is threatened.‖ (Mearsheimer 
2003, 55) Thus the propaganda used by the neo-cons and Bush himself in his rhetoric on 
the importance of this war is a fallacy to begin with. Saddam’s survival was not 
threatened by the United States or any of its allies’ since historically with all the 
sanctions Iraq has faced, the Baath regime did not wage any war or terrorist threat on 
the U.S. Saddam was only a threat to his own people, thus democratization was the most 
impeding issue in this case.  
 
Though the classical realist theory of balance of power and the state as the sole actor do 
not adhere to the different religious and sectarian concerns, yet they all agreed on the 
fallacy of the argument of the attack on Iraq. For the region to enjoy a balance of power, 
Iraq would need to maintain rather than oust its Sunni regime. This is in order to match 
the Shi’ite power in Iran. Thus the balance of power in the region is not an issue that 
ought to concern the United States. 
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From the Wilsonian point of view, democracy and autonomy may adhere to the realist 
perspective. While the Wilsonian stand would ―focus on promoting democracy, which 
they believe is the most powerful political ideology on the face of the earth‖ 
(Mearsheimer 2005, 4), yet the Iraqis in general are very suspicious of the imposition of 
such a democracy. Democracy should be done by the people and not imposed from 
above. Moreover, the existence of a strong civil society and a strong middle class are 
the cornerstones of democracy. Democracy is achieved gradually, and must be 
approached incrementally by all the different ethnic groups. For democracy to be 
legitimate, it must spring from within the different ethnic groups. Further, a country 
being democratic does not commit it to a particular governing model. The Wilsonian 
school holds that democracy cannot happen overnight through external intervention, it is 
an internal matter. 
 
The U.S. intervention was seen as a tool to exploit Iraq and to once again colonize it in a 
new disguise as well as weakening central state authority in favor of splintering ethnic 
and sectarian divisions particularly along Shi’ite and Sunni perspectives. These 
arguments will be further highlighted while also studying the case of Iraq. It will be 
seen how the different ethnic and religious groups have used this argument to rally the 
people against the U.S. intervention. How the terrorist acts were also done under this 
specific alibi will also be shown. The logic behind it was their common rhetoric for their 
condemnation of the U.S. military operation in Iraq.  
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Another major issue which has weakened the cause of the U.S. mission in Iraq was the 
dismantling of the Iraqi Army. The Army is traditionally seen as the cornerstone state 
security represents a powerful neutral force in country which is invaluable in times of 
instability. Although the Army was created by the Baath regime, there is no good reason 
to assume that with the toppling of the regime the army could play no positive, 
stabilizing role. The army’s dismantlement has led to the lack of a consistent security in 
Iraq thus exacerbating the acts of terror that took place and still are taking place until 
this day.  
 
3.4 Ethnic Democracy in Crisis 
 
It is evident from both the U.S. and Iraqi perspectives and the rising concerns on both 
sides that democracy has a long way to go. A governance model cannot be made over 
night without an in-depth study of the political environment and concern in each 
country on its own. Salamey pithily notes ―it is evident that the governance model for a 
specific country must take into account circumstances in the inter-ethnic demographic 
mix: the history of inter-ethnic tension and conflict; the extent of ethnic cross-border 
linkages and interventions; the degree of economic development and resource 
distribution; and the existing democratic tradition‖. (Salamey 2005, 196)  
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After Operation Iraqi Freedom better known as the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the ―initial effort to restore political 
sovereignty to Iraqis began on November 15, 2003 after the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi GC reached an agreement for the transfer of power and 
the establishment of a Transitional Iraqi Government (TG) by June 2004‖(Salamey 
2005, 191). 
The United States advisors on the future of Iraq posed primary questions on the way 
forward ―including determining the authority of the occupying power, balancing Shi’ite 
ambition, Kurdish separatism, and Sunni alienation; creating a system of checks and 
balances; and enshrining respect for human rights in the law‖ (Marr 2005, 181).  
 
This background on the U.S. decision to invade Iraq will set up the context for further 
study of the federal state of Iraq. As this study aims to analyze the events which took 
place after the U.S. invasion and try to assess the federal model specifically in regards 
to the four variables which are nationalism, ethnicity/sectarianism, distribution of 
wealth and security, this historical information is critical to the study. The debate on 
whether the federal model fits the Iraqi experience can be shown through further 
analysis of the phases of the democratization process. 
 
3.5Iraqi Transitional Law: Federalization of Power 
 
The second milestone in the future of Iraq was the Transitional Administrative Law 
which was the work of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as a means to transfer 
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power to a new sovereign Iraqi interim government. ―CPA and the Iraq Governing 
Council took a fundamental step toward this goal in March 2004, when they signed the 
Law of Administration for the state of Iraq for the Transitional Period (hereafter 
referred to as the transitional law). The transitional Law is intended to govern the affairs 
of Iraq until the Iraqis approve a permanent constitution and a permanent Iraqi 
government takes office‖ (GOA 2004, 1). However, it did not fully gain a complete 
Iraqi back up to its mission since it ―fell far short of gaining the  consensus of Iraqis, 
and instead it became an issue for exploiting the ethno-religious divide‖ (Salamey 2005, 
192). 
 
The role of the transitional law was to organize the political and federal life of the new 
Iraq. Accordingly, ―the Iraq government will be a federal system designed to prevent 
concentration of power in the federal government and to encourage the exercise of local 
authority and participation in government affairs ―(GOA 2004, 8).  
 
In short, the role of the different 18 governorates will ―name a governor and form 
municipal and local councils. Elections for governorate councils will take place at the 
same time as elections for the National Assembly (no later than January 31, 2005). 
Governorate councils will have the authority to impose taxes and fees, organize 
administration of the governorate, implement projects at the provincial level 
independently or with other organizations, and conduct other activities consistent with 
applicable laws. In addition, governorate councils will assist the federal government in 
coordinating federal ministry operations within their governorates, including reviewing 
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annual ministry plans and budgets as they relate to activities in the governorate. The 
transitional law also encourages the federal government to devolve other functions to 
lower levels of government where appropriate. ― (GOA 2004, 9) 
Many Iraqis were very suspicious of the role the National Assembly and the TAL as 
they had complete power over all the aspects of citizens’ daily life. The most prominent 
opposing sect was the Sunnis as they considered the January 2005 as an affirmation of 
ousting them from power. (Marr 2005, 180) 
Furthermore, the TAL ― also excluded important political constituencies which are not 
represented on the governing council, including (but not limited to) the group associated 
with Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sunni Council, Arab nationalists, credible civil society 
groups and professional associations‖ (Al-Shahristani 2004, 32). This was a major set-
back for the TAL since it did not gain the legitimacy it had been seeking since its 
appointment.  
 
The following table shows the different power structure under the Iraqi Transitional 
Law.  
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Table 1 
 
 
3.6 Elections and Constitution: Assessing Power Sharing Strategies in 
Transition 
 
This transition led to the first post-Saddam elections on January 30, 2005, ―for a 275-
seat transitional Assembly; a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces (41 
seats each; 51 Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats)‖ (Katzman 
2006, 1). They all fell under the transitional assembly which chose the ―presidency 
council‖ made up of the president and two deputies, the prime minister and the cabinet. 
Their mission was to draft the constitution and re-run elections for a permanent 
government. It is very important to note that the elections were conducted based on 
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closed-list proportional representation with female representation in every third 
position. (Katzman 2006, 1) 
 
When taking a closer look at the interest of the various groups who turned out for the 
elections, ―those best positioned: Shi’ite Islamist Parties, the Kurds, and established 
secular parties‖ (Katzman 2006, 2). The Sunnis were dispersed between moderate and 
hard-line Islamists where the latter called for election boycotts due to their fears of 
misrepresentation. Although the Bush administration tried their best to follow the 
strategy of ― inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority 
protections‖(Conetta 2005, 1), yet in December 2005 a major observation of the new 
elections showed that the procedures have put the Sunni Arabs of Iraq at a great 
disadvantage since ―about 24 percent of Iraq’s population resides in Sunni Arab 
majority provinces – but the present elections system allots them only 20 percent of the 
230 assigned seats‖ ( Conetta 2005, 1). This is of great importance since it pinpoints the 
problematic aspects of power-sharing in a federal model under different ethnicities. The 
fears of the Sunni Arabs of Iraq were translated into violent actions against the whole 
governing model. When ethnicities feel their representation has been threatened in 
power, security will be shaken. This also leads to a shard in the nationalistic aspirations 
of the country as they all have different agendas and different visions of Iraq. 
Conetta supports this by considering ― the incidence of terrorist violence and military 
operations is much higher in Sunni areas than elsewhere‖ (Conetta 2005, 3). Even with 
their boycott of elections in January 2005. The Sunni Arabs won only 17 seats. The U.S. 
officials observed that factions that formed the government at that time were not 
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―sufficiently inclusive of Sunnis, even though it had Sunnis as Assembly speaker, one 
of the two deputy presidents; one of the three deputy prime ministers; Defense Minister; 
and five other ministers‖(Katzman 2006, 2). Predictably the Shi’ites and the Kurds, both 
of whom objected heavily to the Sunni drafted constitution, dominated all the other 
positions  
 
In another study of the January 2005 Iraqi elections, Carl Conetta highlights the fact that 
―the problems with the Iraqi election process do not end with the Sunni community‖ 
(Conetta 2005, 2). He uses the term ―bait and switch‖ in his attempt to explain the 
problems of the elections as perceived by the Iraqi population. Accordingly, ―the ―bait‖ 
is the promise that by casting ballots Iraqis can reclaim their government and their 
sovereignty‖ (Conetta 2005, 2). What does that mean? In other words, the Iraqis started 
to feel the need for a change in their country after the U.S. occupation. Their aspirations 
and concerns for Iraq were put into two important issues at stake. They ―want the 
United States out and do not trust the governing authorities it has put in place‖(Conetta 
2005, 2).  
This is one of the four variables under study: security. It has united the Shi’ites and the 
Sunnis on a common resentment of the U.S. occupation as shown in the polls conducted 
during that time. A secret poll was carried out in Iraq after January 2005’s elections 
showing that ― most slates in the January 2005 election -- including the United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA), which won the election -- had in their platform the demand for a 
timetable for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq‖(Achcar& Shalom 2005).  
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However, the elections might be a reassertion of the then-current status quo at the time. 
Conetta defines the ―switch‖: ―Most Iraqis will go to the polls expecting to achieve one 
thing while actually legitimizing a different outcome‖(Conetta 2005, 2). In the case of 
2005 elections, it legitimized the invasion of Iraq by U.S. troops and their presence in 
the country. He concludes his account of the January elections: ―Both the structure and 
context of the political process will likely frustrate the will of the people. The election 
as currently designed is not merely ―flawed‖. It is part of a counterfeit process that will 
impede the development of a truly sovereign and stable Iraq‖. (Conetta 2005, 3). 
 
 Whereas on the other hand, the elections will be the victory of Bush’s vision in Iraq and 
not a real democratic practice since the features of the process has been foggy and 
unclear for most Iraqis. Conetta also outlines the shape of the electoral process in two 
major categories which are ―Utter confusion will cloud the voters’ choices‖ and ―the 
expatriate parties favored by the United States will enter the election contest with 
overwhelming advantages in resources and organization‖ (Conetta 2005, 4) These two 
important factors played a major role in the outcome of the elections.   
 
Another objection to those elections was the fact that there was no allocation of any 
assembly seats to provinces. Iraq was considered as a single electoral district which 
counters the federal theory. The problem mainly worsened due to ―the fact that ethno-
religious group tend to concentrate geographically. Thus, the regional fight over basic 
representation takes an ethnic hue, with each group always threatening to relatively 
disenfranchise the other‖ (Conetta 2005, 4).  
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The Iraqi Transitional Administration Law (TAL) set the course of action for the 
constitution’s adoption with very thorough deadlines. However, administrating a new 
constitution for a troubled state is not an easy process. It stated the completion of the 
draft constitution by the National Assembly by August 15th, 2005. Furthermore, ― the 
referendum on the permanent constitution is to be held by October 15, 2005; if the 
constitution is approved, then Iraq’s third elections of 2005 will be held by December 
15 for whatever permanent structures are dictated by the permanent constitutional text‖( 
Brown 2005, 4).  
 
The constitution is one of the most important milestones of the new Iraq. As Mohamed 
Shaker stresses    ―the stability inside Iraq can only be judged when the people 
themselves would be allowed to elect their own representatives and agree on their new 
constitution in the year 2005. This would be the real test for the stability of Iraq‖ 
(Shaker 2004, 76). Furthermore, the constitution was always the real trigger for the 
political stability or instability in any nation or country.  As Al-Sharistani explains 
―without a legitimate process leading to a consensus-based agreement, the political 
dynamics in Iraq will continue to revolve around force and survival rather than 
democratization and security‖ (Al-Shahristani 2004, 33). 
 
 So what happened after the Iraqi Transitional Law and the first elections took place in 
January 2005? 
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In April 2005, the parliament selected Jalal Talabani (Kurd) as the President and 
Ibrahim Jaafari (Shi’ite) as Prime Minister. The sectarian issue is one of the key issues 
in the Iraqi crisis. As the ―war on Iraq has accentuated and dramatized the existence of 
the three major fabrics of the Iraqi society: the Shi’ites in the south, the Sunnis in the 
center and the Kurds in the North‖ (Shaker 2004, 76). 
 
The issues of controversy which were mainly highlighted by Brown were religion 
specifically Islam, Federalism, Security, and Structures of Authority. These are the 
variables used in this study of Iraq in addition to the distribution of wealth. 
 
To start with, religion and more specifically sectarian or ethnic issues were of main 
concern to the engineers of the Iraqi constitution. The constitution cannot exist without 
taking into consideration the most disputed issue in a deeply divided country such as 
Iraq. The key issue is Islam or appliance of the Sharia Law. According to Brown, ― the 
TAL introduced complicated new language – making no reference to shari’a as such, 
but stating that Islam would be a source of legislation and that no law could be issued 
that ―contradicted the fixed elements of Islam that are the subject of consensus‖ (Brown 
2005, 7). Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution states that ―First: Islam is the official religion 
of the State and is a foundation source of legislation‖.  
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This article has created much tension in Iraq especially in the Shiaa sect over the fact 
that for them Islam was established as ― ―a‖ source rather than ―the‖ source of 
legislation‖ (Salamey 2005, 193). The implication here is that other religious or secular 
parties might be able to impose new legislations in the future according to the Iraqi 
constitution.  
 
Another issue of great importance to consider the fears of the various groups or 
ethnicities in Iraq as Saddam Hussein’s rule was predominantly oppressive of the 
country’s minorities.  Rend Rahim Frencke best summarized the two objectives of the 
peace-building process in Iraq that might be reflected as a start in the constitution. As a 
start, it is vital ―to ensure that different ethnicities can coexist in peace, that no single 
group has an overriding power over the other, and that the interests of all groups are in 
balance‖, while on the other hand, there is a need ― to create a strong Iraqi identity and a 
sense of common Iraqi citizenship‖(Francke 2003). Security is the power and resources 
of each ethnic group and nationalism are the core of the solution of the Iraqi crises. The 
constitution and the governing model of Iraq have been engineered to secure these 
essential variables in the peace building process.  An example which was disputed on 
different levels and which might lead to the normalization of inter-ethnic relations is 
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Article 58 was used to set the outline 
of the pressing disputable issues in Iraq. ―Article 58(A) outlines mechanisms for 
resolving disputes over property rights; Articles 58(B) and (C)discuss the possible 
mechanisms and timing for determining the status of disputed territories‖( GOA 2004, 
13). The engineers of the Iraqi constitution took this article into great consideration due 
42 
 
to its significance in aligning the different fractions of Iraq. Article 140 states the 
following: 
― Article 140: 
 First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete 
the implementation of the requirements of all the subparagraphs of Article 58 of the 
Transitional Administrative Law. 
 Second: The responsibility taken upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law 
shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this 
Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and consensus 
and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine 
the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.‖ (Iraqi 
Constitution 2005) 
 
The issue of Kirkuk needs a thorough analysis but for the time being it remained part of 
the central government until a consensus is reached. The point in these two articles was 
to set the outlines of disputed matters and put them into a political and governing 
framework. They were given priority due to their resemblance of political unity between 
the different ethnic bodies in Iraq.  
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As to religious fears, the Iraqi constitution gave very important sections to the freedom 
of worship as included in Articles 39 and 41 whereby: 
―Article 39: Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to 
their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices. This shall be regulated by law. 
 
Article 41: First: The followers of all religions and sects are free in the: A. Practice of 
religious rites, including the Husseini ceremonies (Shi’ite religious ceremonies) B. 
Management of the endowments, its affairs and its religious institutions. The law shall 
regulate this. Second: The state guarantees freedom of worship and the protection of the 
places of worship‖ (Iraqi Constitution 2005). 
  
Though the republic of Iraq has been declared as an Islamic republic; nonetheless, all 
religions have the freedom to choose and practice their own beliefs. This helps lessen 
the religious fears in any of the different ethnicities present in Iraq. 
 
In a pre-evaluation of the issues concerning the problems which may arise from the 
imposition of federalism on Iraq, Nathan Brown considered that ―the principle is not the 
issue – none of the major groups likely to play an active role oppose the idea. Instead, 
arguments will focus on substance and detail. The issue is difficult both because of the 
historical background and the current situation‖ (Brown 2005,  8). The United States is 
trying to create a federal state in Iraq after it has long experienced a centralized state. 
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The first difficulty which surfaced, as mapped by Brown, was the recognition by the 
TAL of three levels of government which were ―central, regional and provincial. The 
middle category – regional government – was created only for the Kurdish region, but 
other regions are offered the option of emulating the Kurdish example‖(Brown 2005, 9). 
This is the first challenge for federalism in Iraq. The Kurds have been given a greater 
veto power in the constitution which might prove threatening to the other two major 
groups, the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. 
 
The constitution has come to assert the new identity of Iraq where the first article states 
―The Republic of Iraq is an independent, sovereign nation, and the system of rule in it is 
a democratic, federal, representative (parliamentary) republic‖(Iraqi Constitution 2005) 
 
Moreover, the constitution outlines the authority of the federal government in Article 
107.―Article 107: The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the 
following matters: First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; 
negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, 
signing and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and 
trade policy; 
 Second: Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and 
managing armed forces to secure the protection, and to guarantee the security of Iraq's 
borders and to defend Iraq;‖  
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The powers of the federal government will not be of major dispute with the regional and 
provincial since it will be a uniting factor between the different powers and will only 
deal with international affairs and security with one capital which is Baghdad. Ibrahim 
Al-Mashri explains the governing model outlined in the constitution. ―In other words, 
two governorates could form their own entity or all nine can unite in this manner‖ (Al-
Marashi 2005, 152). Moreover, he highlights the importance of the ―legislation in these 
federations cannot contradict any of these articles of the current draft constitution, and 
technically, no federated unit can separate from Iraq that would violate the charter‖(Al-
Marashi 2005, 152).  
 
The constitution respected the basics of the federal governing model as it guaranteed ―a 
bicameral legislature in a parliamentary system in the making, however, membership in 
the upper chamber, its powers and operating principles are far from being clear‖ 
(Kalayciglu 2005, 117).  The ambiguity in the Iraqi constitution of the mechanism of 
federalism may prove to be the greatest setbacks of the system since the Iraqis did not 
have any previous experience with this model.  
 
Another very important part of the constitution lies in the distribution of wealth in the 
federal state especially of sharing oil revenues. Especially since ― the major initial 
danger of such an envisioned federation plan would be a struggle over resources 
between as well as within the provinces‖(Salamey 2005, 197). 
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The following articles in the constitution reaffirm the importance of the distribution of 
wealth: 
―Article 108: Oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions 
and governorates. 
 Article 109: First: The federal government with the producing governorates and 
regional governments shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
current fields provided that it distributes oil and gas revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country with a set allotment 
for a set time for the damaged regions that were unjustly deprived by the former regime 
and the regions that were damaged later on, and in a way that assures balanced 
development in different areas of the country, and this will be regulated by law. 
Second: The federal government with the producing regional and governorate 
governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil 
and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the 
most advanced techniques of the market principles and encourages investment.‖ (Iraqi 
Constitution 2005) 
 
As outlined in the articles of the constitution above, the issue of oil revenues is vital for 
most of the disputes between the various ethnic/sectarian groups. Furthermore, ― the 
Shi’a and the Kurdish factions are united on the issue that they should profit from Iraq’s 
oil resources. Both communities rarely benefited from the state’s largesse during the 
Ba’thist era‖(Al-Marashi 2005, 154). Thus such a structuring of the oil revenues will 
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avoid the centralization of wealth in the hand of one faction and it will provide the 
financial security of all the three major ethnic groups in addition to the minorities’ 
rights. 
 
Thus distribution of wealth is a very important variable in the peace building process of 
any Middle Eastern or Arab state especially due to the historical dependency of the 
Middle Class on the state institution and particularly the Baathist regime. 
 
Moreover, the criterion of federalism as seen in the constitution rests in the division of 
power between the federal and the regional governments. Kalaycioglus considers that 
―Article112 of the Constitution clearly states that all of those functions not specified in 
the Constitution are automatically assigned to the regions and provinces. Thus, all 
power belongs to the regions and provinces, and only as much power as they consider 
appropriate are to be devolved from the regions to the Federal government of Iraq‖ 
(Kalaycioglu 2005, 120). 
 
 In addition, Iraq is a rich country in resources especially in oil, gas and water. The 
wealth is distributed in different provinces leaving some provinces more deprived than 
other. If this issue is not handled with great care, clashes will erupt over the wealth of 
the country and the peace process will fail in getting the different disputing parties to 
reconcile. 
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Another significant point of dispute as pointed out by the ICG report in 2003 are ethnic 
identities since they ―are deeply ingrained, not least because of the Baathist repression. 
Time is needed for them to be reshaped to accommodate and be accommodated in the 
new Iraq‖(ICG 2003, 11). Moreover, the ethno-sectarian rivalry ,if not dealt with 
properly, would affect the different political life of Iraq.  
 
A brief background of Iraq shows that Iraq had a huge historical ethnic problem. Iraq is 
characterized by deeply rooted diversities along different dimensions, particularly 
ethnicity, religion, language and nationality. According to ethnic diversity it is 
comprised respectively of Arabs , Sunni and Shi’ites, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians and 
Armenians. However, the three major ethno-secterian factions mainly involved in 
disputes are the Kurdish, Sunni and Shi’ites factions. Each of these groups has a 
different aspiration for the future of Iraq.  
 
On August 28, the Iraqi draft constitution was ready and then it was voted upon the 15th 
of October 2005 where voters approved an Islamic federal democracy. ―Sunni 
opponents achieved a two-thirds ―no‖ vote in two provinces but not in the three needed 
to defeat the constitution‖ (Katzman 2009, 11). Thus the Sunnis were the major group 
who had apparent problems with the constitution. Although they were promised a 
referendum to appease them six months later, which until this date has not been 
completed, yet violence started directly after the December 2005 elections. 
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Moreover, the formula designed for the elections was particularly sensitive to the Sunni 
representation as ―each province contributed a pre-determined number of seats to the 
new ―Council of Representatives‖. Of the 275 – seat body, 230 seats were allocated this 
way, and there were 45 ―compensatory‖ seats for entities that did not win provincial 
seat but gained votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the 
election constituency been the whole nation‖ (Katzmann 2006, 4).  This election gained 
popular voted and around ―seventy percent of registered Iraqi voters went to the polls‖ 
(New York Times 2005). The election did not witness major violence also and it went 
smoothly. 
 
The patterns and allegiances of the voters could show from the lists they chose since ― 
the results suggest that voters chose lists representing their sects and regions, not secular 
lists‖ (Katzman 2006, 4). This is a very important finding and it gives a wave of the 
Iraqi sentiment towards going back to their different ethnicities and not Iraqi 
nationalism as a whole.   
 
The elections led to the appointment of Nouri El-Maliki in 2006 as prime Minister who 
was a Shi’ite hardliner. Maliki was the spokesman of the Dawa party and the United 
Iraqi Alliance which was the coalition of the Shi’ite parties in 2005. They ―won the 
most seats in elections in December 2005‖(BBC News 2010). Jalal Talabani stayed as 
President after the approval of the Council of Representatives with two deputy 
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presidents – a Shi’ites and a Sunni. Consequently, after the formation of the government 
and the different strategies put by the politicians to mobilize Iraq into stability, reality 
was not the same. Maliki’s efforts to reconcile with the Sunni sect by reversing de-
Baathification did not stop the insurgencies from threatening the security of Iraq. 
Moreover, more important issues like water and oil were the kindle of the civil war that 
took place in Iraq between the years 2005 and 2007.  According to the International 
Crisis Group Report in January 2009, there were two contradictory points of view on 
the reasons behind the inefficiency of the governing model put into motion. The main 
reason behind the outbreak of the war was the illegitimacy of the parties elected as a 
whole. On the one hand, ― the secterian civil war of 2005-2007 was a principle reason 
for poor governance in mixed-population governorates‖( ICG 2009, 9), while the 
council members tried to ―defend their performance, blaming inexperience and 
overwhelming security challenges in 2005-2008 for deficiencies in governance‖ (ICG 
2009, 9). Thus the argument remains that the reasons behind bad governance is 
combined between lack of experience and the civil war though no one tried to take a 
closer look at the deficiency of the governing model itself.  In addition, the violence that 
occurred during those years was not of the same standards in all councils as some 
witnessed more violence than the others. In an interview done by the ICG with Nasef 
Jasem Ali al-Abadi, Basra provincial council deputy chairman for the Islamic Virtue 
Party (Fadhila) where he assessed the situation at the time, he considered that ―some 
council members fell below their constituents’ expectations‖(ICG 2008).  Another 
council member considered that the external meddling in the authorities of both the 
provincial and the central governments has led to the turmoil in those years. Yet, there 
was real criticism coming from outside the councils. 
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According to a local Sadrist politician ―people were completely disappointed with both 
the local and central government. This is because in the last three or four years we have 
seen nothing but destruction and killing. We have seen no reconstruction, or 
infrastructure building, or help for the poor. In brief, we have seen nothing we did not 
also see during Saddam’s time‖ (ICG 2008).  
 
 Basically chaos was everywhere even after the elections of 2005 and the endorsement 
of the Iraqi constitution. There was no real plan on the division of power between the 
central government and the other 18 governorates. Although some of the issues were 
tackled in the constitution on how the power will be distributed, yet, the budgets were 
not as clear cut and reality did not manage to adhere to the constitution itself. The Iraqis 
went back to a state of chaos that was the same as in the pre 2003 invasion and regime 
change. The players changed but the game stayed the same with real ethnic divisions 
playing the major role in rallying for their security and distribution of power.  
 
The main challenges in the years following 2005 until 2008 were the Sunni 
insurgencies. Katzman rendered this phenomenon to the fact  that ―until 2008, the 
duration and intensity of a Sunni Arab – led insurgency defied many expectations 
because it was supported by much of the Iraqi Sunni population that felt humiliated at 
being ruled by Shi’ites and Kurds‖(Katzman 2008, 25). Although many U.S. officials 
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tried to underestimate the violence taking place in Iraq during those years; yet it was 
clearly a sectarian civil war between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites. 
 CBS news reported ―behind the blood and chaos of the insurgents’ bombs, there is an 
undeclared civil war already underway in Iraq, between the Sunni minority who ruled 
the country under Saddam and the Shi’ite majority‖ (Pace, 2005).  Lara Logan , 
correspondent of CBS News, went on to describe it as a ―ruthless cleansing of the 
country’s towns and cities‖ (Pace 2005).   
 
Another Editorial from Time by Tony Karon considered that the main person who can 
revert the sectarian war in Iraq is Moqtada Sadr since he had gained a lot of credibility 
for both sects due to his political standings. The reasons behind this are his emergence 
to power ― as the key broker in the Shi’ite alliance that dominated January’s elections; 
his primary support base is among the 3 million Shi’ites of East Baghdad, which would 
put his militias on the main frontline of any sectarian civil war; and his uncompromising 
stand against the U.S. presence – as well as his opposition to the idea of a Shi’ite 
autonomous region in the south favored by the largest party in his coalition- has given 
him unparalleled credibility (for a Shi’ite leader) among Iraq’s Sunnis‖(Karon 2006).  
The trust in the person of Sadr was very important in alleviating the sectarian war 
between the two sects.  
 
Another important milestone for the Iraqi civil war was in 2006 when the Sunni Iraqis 
asked for U.S. military assistance against Al-Qaeda in Anbar. This was the first signal 
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of the shift of Sunni politics against the insurgencies. The Sunni leaders who called for 
this assistance called themselves the ―Awakening‖. (Katzman 2006, 26) 
 
In the meantime, the U.S. biggest fear was the threat they might be faced with during 
the reconstruction of the Iraqi military. Their strategy ―requires the armed forces to earn 
the trust of the local population by providing security and by proving to be an honest 
broker of the internecine disputes‖ (Lake 2009).  This was proven when the 
commanders of the U.S. turned over the military responsibility to the ―Sons of Iraq‖ 
militants who helped in countering the attacks on the Sunni population in Anbar. This 
group was made up mainly of Sunni fighters with some moderate Shi’ite fighters. 
However, not all the Iraqi population agreed to empower the ―Sons of Iraq‖ especially 
when their ―program caused some tensions between Maliki and the U.S. officials‖, 
especially when their biggest fear lay in ―empowering the Sunnis particularly in the 
security services.  
 
Maliki and his Shi’ite allies have resisted U.S. plans to integrate all the Sons into the 
Iraqi security forces (ISF), instead agreeing to allow only 20% (Katzman 2009, 26). 
Another major point concerning the security lies in the many divisions inside of the 
Iraqi army where they started to hold their allegiances to their political leaders rather 
than to the Iraqi central government. (Lake 2009)  
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Most political analysts who considered the uprising tensions between the Sunnis and the 
Shi’ites as a civil war saw that the bombing of Askariya Shi’ite Mosque in Samara 
twice during 2006 and 2007 heightened the clashes between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites 
though it was Al-Qaeda insurgencies who performed it. The second attack did not have 
the same repercussion as the first mainly due to the fact that the ―political elite appealed 
for calm‖ (Katzman 2009, 29). This is important to note as it refers to the 
Consociational model where the political elite try to establish the balance of power in 
their communities.  
 
The time period between 2005-2008 serves as the best example of the four variables set 
by this study of Iraqi federalism . To begin with, security was at its lowest during this 
period which led to various uprisings and clashes between two major groups. It was 
mainly an example of the survival of the fittest where even the army, the core of 
security, was targeted based on political/ethnic/sectarian allegiances. Here the second 
variable (sectarianism and ethnicity) come into play for it is the background of these 
religious sects that was the major reason behind the clashes and the disparity of the 
source of security. It interplays with nationalism as the conflicting groups did not agree 
on the different visions of Iraq. The only ethnicity which stayed on the sidelines were 
the Kurds whom had already established a semi-autonomous region for themselves 
inside Iraq and protected their ethnicity and security although there were still unresolved 
issues such as the issue of Kirkuk. According to a report by the ICG ―the territorial 
dispute is blocking political progress in Iraq, contributing to the delay in passing a law 
on sharing oil revenue, and threatening to put off critical provincial elections‖ (Borger  
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2008). Kirkuk is one of the most debatable territories in Iraq since it is a very oil-rich 
country. The distribution of wealth comes into play here since the Iraqi constitution 
states that in the federal state of Iraq, the different governorates are to share the riches of 
the country. The engineers of the constitution were concerned with these notions though 
there was no clear strategy on how this would be mobilized. 
 
3.7 The change of political discourse during the 2009 Provincial 
Elections: the Consolidation of Power Sharing State 
 
The 2009 Provincial elections marked a change in the political discourse of religious 
candidates, especially when appealing to the Iraqi people. Elections were only held in 
14 governorates basically excluding the Kurdistan regional government, which 
accordingly had the authority to set elections on their own time. The elections’ 
mechanism was altered  wherein it ― was the first time that a partial open-list system 
was used: it meant contrary to earlier elections, voters were not compelled to choose 
from fixed slates of party-ranked candidates, but rather voted for both a list and an 
individual candidate on that list‖(ICG 2010, 3). The population could use their own 
candidates as they saw fit without reference to a whole list’s priorities. This provided 
more choice to citizens, rendering the overall process more democratic.  
 
These elections also witnessed a rage against the misconduct, corruption and the 
malfunction of the previously elected members. Voters seemed to want to choose a 
better alternative since they seemed to have ―blamed these parties’ deference to clerics 
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for their failure to govern‖ (ICG 2010, 3). One example of the change in the political 
discourse was Al-Maliki’s changing his formerly religious rhetoric into a more 
nationalistic one. Maliki swept most of the polls in Baghdad and most of the south 
where he was viewed as ―a strong nationalist and non-secterian leader‖ (ICG 2010, 5), 
though he comes from a religious party. People believed the party’s function was more 
secular in its core. Sadr lost a lot of his support due to the violence of 2005-2008 that 
discredited his party in Shi’ite eyes. The very interesting thing about the 2009 elections 
was the ―resurgent and unified Sunni Arab bloc, flying the banner of Iraqi nationalism, 
recaptured all its lost ground. ‖ (ICG 2010, 5) 
 
Nonetheless, even with the apparent shift from religious slogans to more nationalistic 
ones, the International Crisis Group noted that ―the elections were not as sharp a defeat 
for religious parties as might initially have seemed‖ (ICG 2010,7). The winners of the 
elections were ―Maliki’s State of Law/Dawa’a, ISCI and the Sadirists came in first‖ 
while in contrast ― the secular parties performed poorly, defeated less by their political 
enemies’ popularity than by the electoral system the ruling parties has crafted, by the 
organizational weakness and by their inability to mobilize popular support‖ (ICG 2010, 
7). All in all, what seemed to be a shift in the political discourse of the religious parties 
into a more nationalistic approach was nothing more than an electoral strategy to gain 
popular vote. The rhetoric was the only thing that was dropped. At the heart of the 
matter, the Sunnis still rallied for the Sunnis and the Shi’ites still rallied for the Shi’ites. 
The defeat of the secular parties proves the deep ethnic/secterian divisions which, even 
if disguised under rhetoric flourishes, still existed in hearts of its people.  
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3.8 The Emergence of New Federalized Iraq after U.S. Pullout 
 
On the 27th of February 2009, President Obama announced the end of combat mission 
in Iraq by 31st of August 2010. This is a very important milestone for Iraq as the 
population has been viewing the military existence of the U.S. with a lot of suspicion. It 
targets the security of Iraq which has long been fought for by several factions of the 
Iraqi community. The announcement came just in time before the March 2010 elections 
playing a major role in the preparation for it.  Another major point to be considered in 
the elections are the disputed areas in Iraq especially Kirkuk which was mainly used by 
the Kurdish political groups as a point of power to win the Iraqi elections.  
 
The elections in 2010 witnessed minor changes in the electoral law of 2005, as the 
Kurdish fight to gain Kirkuk and add it to their regional government. Kirkuk was one of 
the most serious roadblocks since ― the question of Kirkuk, and whether elections in this 
conflicted governorate should receive special treatment, as had occurred for the 
provincial elections‖(ICG 2010, 20).  With the three weeks to reach an agreement 
regarding the new electoral law and the different inputs from the Kurdish parties and 
Sistany, an open-list system was finally agreed upon. However, it was vetoed by Vice-
President Tareq al-Hashimi under pressure from Iyad Allawi and Saleh al-Multaq who 
were concerned with the ―so-called compensatory national seats‖ (ICG,2010:22) in 
addition to Hashimi’s belief that the election law did not represent the Iraqis abroad. 
(Ottaway and Kaysi 2009, 2).  
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The law finally adopted increased the number of parliamentary seats to ―325 seats- 307 
plus eight minority seats, seven compensatory sears and three extra seats for the Kurdish 
governorates ―(ICG 2010, 25). Another factor bearing on the 2010 elections was the 
revitalization of the Sunni vote which had previously boycotted the elections of 2005. 
Nevertheless, they lacked clear tactics on how to approach the elections since ―many 
influential Sunnis remained on the margins of the political process, either because, as 
formed Baathists, they were shunned, or because they chose to resist the U.S. backed 
process. This weakened the Sunni participation‖ (Ottaway and Kaysi, 2009, 1).  
 
The elections took place on the 7th of March 2010.  The elections led to a narrow 
victory for Iyad Allawai. Former prime minister and member of Iraqiyya block over 
Nouri Al-Maliki, incumbent prime minister and speaker or the State of Coalition. (BBC 
News 2010). This is of great importance since Iyad Allawi is a secular candidate who 
managed to gain votes from both the Sunni and Shi’ite sects.  
 
This paper’s timeline ends with the 2010 elections. The outcome of the elections and the 
formation of the new government are of little relevance to this research as until now it 
had established the basics of the study of the federal model in Iraq. This study focuses 
on the initial years of the Iraqi experience in hopes of discerning the future (if any) of 
federalism in the country.  
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This chapter has given an account of the 2 elections of 2005, the constitution, the so-
called civil war of 2005-2008, 2009 provincial election, and the 2010 elections. These 
different milestones correspond to the four variables in the study of federalism. This 
research has shown the involvement of the different ethnicities in the engineering of the 
electoral laws and the constitution.  
 
The different processes have respected the basic principles of federalism. Nevertheless, 
it had not been an easy process for the Iraqi people who have no previous experience 
with federalism. The main lingering issues for the state of Iraq are security, nationalism, 
ethnicity/sectarianism and distribution of wealth.  
 
As previously discussed and asserted in several instances ―security continues to be one 
of the main demands of voters‖ (BBC News 2010). The change of rhetoric during the 
2009 provincial elections also shows the importance of nationalism. Nationalism, 
however, goes hand in hand with ethnic/secterian interests since after assessing the 2009 
experience, the ethnic/secterian groups still held their allegiances to their own sects. 
Nevertheless, the winning of Iyad Allawai, a secular candidate of the 2010 
parliamentary elections might be the beginning of the reconciliation process between 
the two competing Sunni and Shi’ite sects. As for the issue of Kirkuk and the disputed 
areas, they are a clear representation of the distribution of wealth variable. Once all 
these variables are put on the right track, the Iraqi federal experience will start to 
flourish.  
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Chapter 4 
Iraq and Its Neighboring States’ Foreign Policies 
 
4.1 Foreign Policy in a Divided Society 
 
Foreign relations of Iraq with its neighboring countries are a key aspect of establishing 
peace and stability inside Iraq, especially after 2003 change of regime. The different 
ethnic/sectarian groups in Iraq have different allegiances with foreign powers on the 
basis of protecting their securities against each other.  
 
Gareth Stansfield considers ―the conduct of Iraq’s foreign relations as the country 
emerges from occupation and civil war and embraces a still undetermined and uncertain 
future remains conditioned ― (Stansfield 2010, 1395). Iraq’s political and governing face 
changed drastically since the fall of the regime 2003. New key players have emerged 
and its neighboring countries have seen a lot of opportunities and challenges with them 
especially due to the fact of the presence of the U.S. military forces in Iraq.  
 
The major three countries whose foreign policy tackles Iraq at its core are Iran, Syria, 
and Turkey. All of these countries had major roles in the years after 2003 and until 
today. Iraq’s newly formed elites and even the old political players have strong ties with 
these countries. However, these ties cannot be studied without observing the threats and 
possibilities of the neighboring countries themselves. Moreover, the cadres of these 
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foreign policies cannot be understood without a close consideration of the U.S. foreign 
policy in the region. This study cannot be complete without assessing the external 
factors primarily affecting the success of federalism in Iraq.  
Iraq’s imposed federal experience by foreign intervention cannot be complete without 
the policies of its neighboring countries. Given its geographical statue, Iraq’s federalism 
needs external factors to be fully mobilized. Therefore, this study takes into account the 
foreign policies of Syria, Iran, and Turkey as major players in the Iraqi federal model. It 
is within this context that this study will continue the assessment of an imposed federal 
model by military and political intervention.  
 
The geopolitical environment always affects the governing models in each country. This 
chapter will take a thorough look at the foreign policies of four major players in Iraqi 
politics which are Iran, Turkey and Syria in light of inputs from the U.S. foreign policy. 
Moreover, the approach will give a detailed account of the threats and opportunities of 
each of these countries especially when it comes to the question of federalism in Iraq. 
The major questions to be answered are: What are the foreign policies of each of these 
countries towards Iraq? How do these foreign policies affect the federal model? And 
how do cross-border relations of the different political groups with these countries affect 
the stability or instability of the federal model? 
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4.2 Iran and Iraq Shia: A Long Awaited Foreign Relations 
 
The Iranian-Iraqi relations were never on good terms during Saddam Hussein’s rule. 
The first gulf war of 1980-1988 is an example of the rivalry between the two countries 
in an attempt to assert their importance as regional players. Nevertheless, after the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein and his regime in 2003, Iran’s 
foreign policy was greatly affected with the events especially due to its new rivalry with 
the U.S. regarding nuclear weapons and the latter’s presence in close proximity to Iran’s 
borders. The military threat of Iraq no longer stems out of the Iraqi Baathi military but 
rather from the American troops. ― Iran’s security challenges in the new Iraq is the 
result of Iran’s legitimate concerns in terms of establishing national security on the one 
hand and creating opportunities for it to walk out of geopolitical isolation and thus 
consolidate its credit and influence both regionally and internationally on the other‖ 
(Barzegar 2006, 77).  
 
Consequently, the main issue for Iran is the security concerns which were categorized 
on different levels. To start with, the religious rivalries inside Iraq are direct threat for 
Iran especially when it comes to the enmities between the various Shi’ite political 
groups. Their views differ in nature when it comes to allying themselves with Iran. 
However, a very positive fact for Iran is that all of these Shi’ite political groups consider 
Iran to be the ―natural ally state throughout the region‖ (Barzeger 2006, 70).   
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Iran can be a major counter balance in the inter-ethnic/ inter-secterian relation especially 
since the Arab region is a mostly Sunni-led region.  Iran is keen on making sure that it 
allies itself with the various ethnic/secterian political groups in Iraq. It is not of its 
interest to be viewed as the sole caretaker of the Shi’ites of Iraq since ― too much 
support of the Shi’ite would bring about challenges in Iran’s foreign policy in the long 
term‖ (Barzegar 2006, 80).   
 
Furthermore, the rivalries pose a major threat to Iran’s national security especially that 
if these ethnicities do not get to common grounds, it would lead to the deployment of 
more foreign troops on the borders of Iran. Barzegar goes on to consider that ― at the 
same time, Iran’s rivals and enemies would be granted a chance to enforce pressure and 
influence on the country‖ (Barzegar 2006, 80).  Therefore, one of the major concerns of 
the Iranian foreign policy is to decrease the possibility of territorial disintegration inside 
Iraq because whenever the Shi’ite-Sunni tensions increase, the Kurds are moving more 
and more towards becoming a very powerful independent Kurdish state which would 
affect the Kurdish communities inside Iran itself.   
 
Therefore, ― at present, the chief aim of Iran’s policy in post-invasion Iraq is to maintain 
Iraq’s national unity‖( Barzegar 2008, 49).  Thus, Iran’s position towards more 
moderate Sunnis fluctuates from enmity to cooperation in the country’s attempt to 
establish some kind of common ground in the face of Iraqi disintegration. As for the 
Kurds, Iran’s fear of the good relations of the Kurds with the United States and possibly 
with Israel has led them to take a more compromising stand towards them.  
64 
 
 
In a deeper sense, the coalition with the Iraqi Kurds serves as a deterrent to the 
―plausible coalition of such a government with other regional states and outside powers, 
particularly United States and Israel, in so far as these states pose a threat to Iran, would 
jeopardize Iran’s national interests and pave the way for new instability and tension on 
Iran’s borders‖ (Barzeger 2008, 53). Hence, they have tried to empower their stand with 
the Kurds while using their Shi’ite allies to balance their interest.  
 
Another very important aspect of the relationship between Iraq and Iran is regional 
rivalry. The face of Iraq changed from a secular, minority Sunni rule, to a pre-
dominantly majority Shi’ite rule. As opposed to the previous Iran-Iraqi enmity and their 
habitual balance of power in the region, Iran is opting to a different political approach 
with Iraq. Accordingly, ― the objective of Iran’s foreign policy in the last two years in 
accordance with geopolitical  realities has been moving away from this traditional 
equation‖ (Barzegar 2006, 82). Iraq is now viewed as a potential ally for Iran in the 
region in the face of other Sunni regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran has been 
striving for a long time to get itself out of the regional isolation and play its natural role 
in regional politics. Iraq is a major ticket for Iran out of this strife once the realities of 
the countries are understood. Iraq is strategically positioning itself for Iran to be on 
good terms will all the different ethnic/secterian political groups since it would allow 
them to raise new opportunities.  
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A very important challenge that comes into play for the Iranian foreign policy is the 
tactical advantage the US has gained by moving its troops in Iraq. Their presence 
geographically near the Iranian border poses a huge threat to the country’s security 
especially with the nuclear issue at hand. Iran’s suspicions of the real motives behind 
the U.S. presence in Iraq were translated on several occasions especially since ―the new 
Iraq is the center stage of America’s pressures and threats against Iran and as George W 
Bush himself has stressed on various occasions that a new different Iraq is a pressure 
tool against Iran in order to make this country revise its political orientation‖ (Bazegar 
2006, 84).  
 
In other words, if the Iranian regime does not abide by the rules of the United States, 
they are at a strategic disadvantage as an attack base already established in a 
neighboring country. The threat is just across border. What is more, the presence of the 
American troops in the region disrupts the natural balance of powers since the gulf 
regimes have been strong allies of the United States policies in the region in the face of 
the so-called hegemonic aspirations of Iran. The battle’s likelihood is to happen on Iraqi 
and Lebanese grounds since these two countries’ Shi’ites align themselves with Iran. 
The Americans have ―transformed Iraq into the main ground for exercising pressure on 
the Islamic Republic‖ (Bazegar 2006, 86), whereby they have tried to distort Iran’s 
picture within Iraq.  
 
In conclusion, the Iraqi-Iranian relations can be a new opportunity or an ongoing threat 
to Iran if not well-engineered into Iran’s benefit. The variables of this study especially 
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security, ethno-sectarianism also apply when studying the foreign policy of Iran. 
Although Iran has been relieved of Saddam Hussein’s warmongering, yet it has 
acquired a new U.S. based threat across its border. Security is the most essential fear for 
the Iranians whereby they strategically situated themselves as the caretakers of the 
Shi’ite Iraqis. They have played the ethno-secterian card in the face of the U.S. 
meddling to distort their connections. Iran is constantly seeking an equation which helps 
the country ―to walk out of the geopolitical isolation and redefine its natural role in the 
region’s security equation‖(Barzegar 2006, 86).   
 
In short, the interplay of ethnic-secterian politics and geo-political security play a major 
role in shaping the new Iraqi-Iranian foreign policies whereby Iran is striving to gain 
Iraq as a whole as a strategic ally. Federalism in Iraq is auspicious to Iranian foreign 
policy since it would help this ethno-secterian war torn neighboring country from 
disintegrating themselves into three different states. The stability inside Iraq is one of 
the major concerns for Iran whereby any major violence will lead to the long-term 
aspirations of the Kurds of cession from the state of Iraq or the development of another 
Sunni state so close to the Iranian borders. 
 
4.3 Syria and Secularization: De-Baathification vs. Baathification 
 
The war and the change of regime in Iraq have introduced a new era in the region for 
Syrian foreign policy. At many instances it seemed to Syrian politics that with the 
United States’ presence in the region and their war against terror, their next target will 
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be Syria. Syria was one of the opposing countries of the war on Iraq, ―Syria’s prewar 
support for Saddam Hussein’s regime and subsequent permissiveness in allowing 
foreign jihadists to enter Iraq from Syria had antagonized the United States and made 
Syria a potential target for regime change‖( Simon 2009, 2).  
 
It is important to note that Syria’s ties with Iraq had not been effective before the 
preemptive attack on Iraq’s regime, they had years of bad relations due to Saddam’s war 
on Iran and the relationship started to improve only after the sanctions were placed on 
Iraq before the 2003 war.  
 
The war on Iraq has affected Syria negatively in different aspects as it had threatened its 
national security and economy in various ways. The security problem stems from the 
existence of American troops in close proximity to Syria, as is the case of Iran. 
Although both Syria and the United States had a mutual interest in the fight against Al-
Qaeda and other insurgencies, Syria turned a ―blind eye‖ on the insurgents crossing its 
border to Iraq. (BBC 2008)  
 
In an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2004, Bashar Al-Assad declared his support of these 
insurgents was a form of legitimate resistance. This outraged the U.S. foreign policy 
makers and they started plotting for a similar regime change in Syria; however, ―this 
prospect dimmed as the U.S. occupation became an increasingly problematic drain on 
resources‖( Simon 2008, 28).   
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According to Michael Gerson, ―Syria, however, is what one former administration 
official calls "lower-hanging fruit‖(Gerson 2007). They have raged the American 
administration with their lax approach to the insurgents coming from their border.  
Nonetheless, Syria realized the importance of cooperation with the Americans 
especially in regards to Al-Qaeda. They then used their Intelligence in handing in 
insurgents to the Americans since it is a matter of national security for the former.  
 
Islamic extremism is a very serious issue for the Syrian regime especially after the 2004 
attack on a diplomatic headquarters in Damascus. (MacAskil 2004). In addition, Syria 
had been the home of the Iraqi ex-Baathi officials who have fled the country after the 
U.S. military operation in 2003. Their strategy was to use these decision makers on the 
insurgents as a way to leverage American presence.  
 
The U.S. then used another method of pressure on the Syrians. They ―ordered the 
closure of the five-hundred-mile oil pipeline running between the northern Iraqi city of 
Kirkuk and the Syrian port of Banias‖ (Simon 2009, 11).  It was only then that the 
Syrian government decided to modify its foreign policy regarding the former cadres of 
Saddam’s regime.   
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As reported on 18 May 2003 by the daily mail ―Saddam’s wife and daughters have been 
thrown out of Syria, it was revealed last night‖ ( Rayner, Daily Mail, 2003).  This was a 
strategic move on the side of Assad to stop the American economical embargo on Syria 
especially since the Syrians have lost a lot of oil wealth after 2003 which has cost the 
Syrians a lot in terms of money and wealth.  This is another Syrian foreign policy 
concern since Syria had long enjoyed the cheap oil coming through those pipelines.  
 
In 2007, in an attempt to control the damage control caused by the Americans to their 
economy Syria and Iraq ―signed a deal to speed up renovation of the Kirkuk-Banias 
pipeline‖(Simon 2009, 2). Oil, trade, and commercial agreements were signed between 
the two countries to help each other economically. Syria has great economic interests in 
Iraq; thus, the stability of Iraq is of great importance to Syria. They have managed to 
develop economic ties with Iraq especially since the Syrians had dealt generously with 
the Iraqi refugee problem.  
 
Another pressing issue for the Syrian regime in the formation of their foreign policy is 
the problem of Iraqi refugees. This situation has inflated the economy of Syria since the 
start of the 2003 war. The immigration of thousands of families of Iraqi refugees to 
Syria presents a very serious security problem. Moreover, there is deep fear that the 
refugees might bring with them deep ethnic and secterian issues. ―Iraqi refugees in Syria 
encompass every ethnic and secterian background, the majority is thought to be Sunni, 
with 15% Shia, and 10% Christian‖ (Simon 2009, 7).  
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Syrian regime’s Alwaite Shi’ite minority is afraid of the additional Sunni majority 
which might aid the Sunni majority in Syria to overthrow the Syrian regime. Moreover, 
this overcrowding comes with an economic burden to the Syrian regime which would 
affect their water and gas consumption and education. Therefore, the Syrian government 
welcomed the call of the Iraqi government for the refugees to go back to Iraq since their 
presence would weaken the Syrian regime in different perspectives. 
 
A fourth factor which comes into play when considering the Syrian foreign policy in 
regards to Iraq is the Kurdish question. Syria is yet another neighboring country which 
has a significant Kurdish population. The 2003 war and the Kurdistan regional 
government in Iraq has posed itself as an alert to the Syrian regime for the fear of a 
Kurdish reawakening in Syria. Although the Syrians had changed their position in 
regards to the Kurdish question and re-aligned themselves with Turkey on this common 
issue; nevertheless Syria took a surprising role in 2007 to offer to mediate the arising 
problems between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey. (Lyon 2007) The 
Syrians are interested in keeping the Kurdish aspirations in check as a strategy against a 
domino effect in Syria. They have acted as mediators and allowed their Syrian Kurds to 
connect with the Iraqis by keeping them under surveillance. Therefore, ―the regime will 
continue to closely monitor Kurdish opposition activities both at home and abroad. The 
government appears to have taken the necessary precautions to prevent a repeat of the 
2004 Qamishi riots any time soon‖ (Simon 2009, 14). 
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As this study highlights, the position of Iraq is of a great deal of importance especially 
to the Syrian government as it helps stabilize the region, offer economic help and keep 
the Kurdish problem in check. The stability of Iraq comes hand in hand with the fate of 
Syrian national security and wealth due to the latter’s reliance on the Iraqi war and the 
great number of Iraqi refugees currently present in Syria. Moreover, the greatest Syrian 
fear as in the case of Iran, the existence of the American troops in Iraq which might be a 
direct threat to the Syrian regime.  
 
As for the aspirations of the Syrian’s regime regarding Iraq ― the most favorable 
outcome in Iraq would be a relatively weak and compliant secular government, strong 
enough to hold the country together and protect its borders‖ (Simon 2009, 21). 
Moreover, the Syrian foreign policy sees the economic and political stability will 
irreversibly ―lay the ground for security‖ (Simon 2009, 22).  Thus their foreign policy is 
shaped by cooperation with the Iraqi government, strong ties with the various secterian 
groups, mediators of the ethnic predicament, and leveraging the American presence in 
the region through their ―under the table‖ facilitation of the insurgents from Syria to 
Iraq. This suggests that it is vital for Syria to play a constructive role in the 
implementing a federal solution in Iraq. A stable and flourishing Iraq is clearly in 
Syria’s economical and security interests.  
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4.4 Turkey and the Kurdish Question 
 
Ever since the U.S. toppling of the Baath regime in 2003, Turkey has been monitoring 
the Iraqi situation very closely due to its fear of an autonomous Kurdish state on its 
border which might lead its Kurdish minority to revolt against the Turkish government 
in an attempt to join the Kurdish state. Moreover, the PKK, has been one of the most 
important threats to Turkey’s national security due to their terrorist attacks on Turkish 
land. Thus Turkey’s policy towards Iraq pivot on two interests which are ― preserving 
that country’s territorial integrity and fighting the PKK, whose rebels use remote 
mountain areas on the border as sanctuary and staging ground for attacks inside Turkey‖ 
(Middle East Report No 81, 2008).  
 
In addition to these two Turkish interests, Turkey has always had an active role in 
promoting peace in the region. Its primary interest due to the geographical setting of 
Iraq is to make sure peace is established and sectarian war is avoided especially since 
any upheaval inside Iraq would have a negative domino effect in the region. 
 
 ―As far as Iraq is concerned, the preservation of Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity as 
well as the restoration of security and stability in the country has been the main 
objectives for Turkey‖( Coskun 2008, 3). Turkey had made sure to establish relations 
with the different secterian/ethnic groups in Iraq even with the Kurdish Regional 
government. They used a ―proactive peace policy‖ since they considered that the worst-
case scenario for Iraq is ―the partition of Iraq is into three states: an Arab state, a Shi’ite 
73 
 
dominated state in southern Iraq and a Turkish state in northern Iraq‖ (Coskun 2008, 4).  
The biggest fear as mentioned earlier is the existence of a Kurdish state that would 
―politicize Kurds in Turkey‖ (Coskun 2008, 4).  
 
According to the Middle East report recommendations of 2005, ―The U.S. and EU need 
to do more to resolve the Kirkuk question and help Ankara protect its vital interests 
without resort to increasingly hollow but destabilizing threats of military intervention‖( 
Middle East Report No 35,  2005). Turkey’s position on the Kurdish question is 
identical to that of Iran and Syria. It has been an issue of national security to them. Yet, 
it had taken further steps to deal with the issue.  
 
In 2007, the Turkish Parliament ―authorized the government Wednesday to send troops 
into northern Iraq to root out Kurdish rebels who have been conducting raids into 
Turkey‖ (msnbc.com news, 10/17/2007). This had produced tension with the United 
States who has been Turkish allies for a long time. Though the decision had been made, 
yet Turkey waited until February 2008 to start its military operation where according to 
the Turkish media ― 3000 to 10 000 troops crossed the Iraqi border on Friday in pursuit 
of separatist insurgents from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)‖ ( theTrumpet.com, 
25 February 2008).   
 
Six days after the Turkish launched the military operation, the Iraqi government reacted 
by denouncing the incursions and asking for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish 
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groups from Northern Iraq. (Guardina.co.uk, 26 February 2008) The military operation 
has put more pressure on the Iraqi government and the U.S. to deal with the PKK and 
give Turkey the right assurances that the attacks will stop. On the other hand, it re-
initiated collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey to deal with the Iraqi issues.  
 
The most important was ― the understanding to eliminate the PKK as a factor in Turkey 
U.S. and Turkey-Iraq relations including relations with the Iraqi Kurds‖ (Altunsik 2009, 
210).  This agreement had helped the 9 day Turkish military incursion whereby the U.S. 
shared their intelligence on where the PKK’s militants might be present. Accordingly, ― 
the trilateral agreement between Turkey, Iraq and the United States was 
created‖(Altunsik 2009, 210).  
 
Turkey’s foreign policy has gained an upper hand in its relations with Iraq after 
successfully managing the PKK problem through military intervention. Thus the 
outcome of the operation had two impacts which were: ― on the one hand, the military 
operations gave Turkey an opportunity to show its resolve to deal with the PKK attacks 
emanating from Iraq. One the other hand, the operations created an opportunity for an 
opening towards the Iraqi Kurds, which was not possible before, due to supportive 
attitude of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) vis-à-vis the PKK‖ (Altunsik 
2009, 210).  
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Turkey has managed to reach its objective through the use of military operations and re-
opening channels with the Kurdish Regional Government and get their support on 
fighting militancy. This was even taken a step further whereby the Higher Strategic 
Council was created to deal with issues of energy, military, industry and politics. 
Another important issue that led the Kurdish Regional Government to change its 
cooperation policy with Turkey was the withdrawal of the U.S. troops decision. Their 
need to have a strong ally in the region in the face of the other ethnic/sectarian groups 
was of vital importance for them and Turkey would be their best ally. Nevertheless, 
Turkey made sure to have good and strong relations with both Sunni and Shi’ite 
secterian groups to pose itself as a mediator of the ethnic/sectarian emancipating 
problem.  
 
Another important interest for the Turkish foreign policy is economic interest. The root 
of this economic interest lies in the fear of the Kurdish independence which connects to 
the issue of Kirkuk. The disputes around Kirkuk lie in its important oil wealth which if 
added to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) would give the KRG full autonomy 
from the state of Iraq. The Scope of this study does not cover the Kirkuk question and 
other disputed areas; nonetheless, Kirkuk remains a very important question for the 
Iraqis, the United States, and all of Iraq’s neighboring countries for it deeply ties to the 
issue of Kurdish autonomy.  
 
As for Turkey’s economic interest, they stem out of a strategically focal point for 
Turkey in preserving security across its borders. Turkey’s geopolitical situation has 
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―impelled Turkey to reach out to Syria, Jordan, and Iran as well as to increase its 
participation in the economic rehabilitation of Gaza and the West Bank, the rebuilding 
of Iraq, and the supplying of the US and coalition occupation forces in that country‖ 
(Olson 2006, 17). The Middle Eastern politics are of great interest to Turkey; thus their 
strife to establish peace in the region stems from its own security concerns.  
 
Turkey also had another vital interest in the economic ties with Iraq and the Kurdish 
Regional Government especially since the trade will be going through the southeastern 
Turkish border which is ―an area heavily populated with Kurds and one of the most 
economically depressed regions of Turkey‖(Olson 2006, 18). Turkish foreign policy 
saw an opportunity in these economic ties since ―an increase in the support of the Kurds 
in the region could lessen the support of the Kurds in the region for militant Kurdish 
nationalist groups‖(Olsen 2006, 18).   
 
Turkey’s foreign policy lies on the advocacy of economic ties and enrichment of their 
Kurdish inhabited areas in the face of the threat of Kurdish militants. Their ties were 
directly linked to the Iraqi government and to the Kurdish Regional government as 
preemptive measures against a possible upheaval from their Kurdish minority to follow 
the path of the Iraqi Kurdish population. Their investment lay in oil and gas which are 
also of huge value to the country’s economy as a whole.  
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4.5 Foreign Policy Assessment of Power Sharing Formulations 
 
The main concern for the Turkey, Iran, and Syria were the Kurdish threat which is 
present in their own countries. The Kurdish question poses a threat to all of these three 
countries since it might have a domino effect on their own Kurdish minorities in each 
respective country. The three countries’ foreign policies lay in establishing good 
relations with the different ethnics/secterian groups in Iraq as a strategy to maintain 
stability between them. Although each country has a more solid relation with one sect or 
ethnic group over the other; yet the three countries have been trying to establish good 
relations with all. It is not in any of these three countries interest to have three different 
states. Their interest lies in having one stable Iraq which provides them with security 
and does not stir their own inter-ethnic/inter-secterian problems.  
 
The stability of Iraq has a lot of repercussions on the stability of its neighboring 
countries due to the existence of various ethnicities and sects which have built strong 
affiliations with the various groups in their respective countries. Nevertheless, Syria and 
Iran’s common fear which has helped shape their foreign policies towards Iraq lay in 
their fear of the U.S. presence in such a close proximity to their borders based on the 
fact that this might threaten their national security. While Turkey saw the U.S. presence 
as a positive point since they have been strong allies for a long time, their fear is when 
the United States troops pull out of Iraq, instability will arise again and the Kurds would 
start asking for full autonomy. Subsequently, the Turkish government had opened its 
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foreign policy to Syria and Iran which are also major players in maintaining stability in 
Iraq and keeping it as unitary country based on a federal model.  
 
The three countries also used economic ties a tool to strengthen their ties with the 
different factions of the Iraqi society and incarnated it in their foreign policy approach. 
Iran, Syria, and Turkey have a vested interest in the natural resources of Iraq. This plays 
a motivating role in efforts put forward to stabilize Iraq by these countries. The two 
variables which play a major role in determining these three countries foreign policy 
towards Iraq are security and ethnic/secterian ties.  
This stability cannot be achieved without a real solution to the ethnic/sectarian problem 
in Iraq. 
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Chapter 5 
Comparative Assessment of Power Sharing Models for Iraq 
 
This paper has thoroughly taken a look at the three possible governing models for a 
deeply divided ethnic/sectarian country which are federalism, consociational democracy 
and majoritarian democracy. When applies to a country like Iraq, federalism presents 
itself with the strongest and most promising future for Iraq. Iraq’s ethnic/secterian set up 
can be truly destructive for the hope a real stable Iraq if the majoritarian model is to be 
applied. As mentioned in the previous chapters, majoritarian governance would only 
lead to the dominancy of the Shi’ite sect over the others. The Sunnis and the Kurds 
would definitely rebel against all-Shi’ite dominancy and the country would be set on a 
long journey of wars. The future after such a mistake would be very bleak for the Iraqis.  
 
As for consociationalism, it would surely hinges upon the secterian problem more and 
more. As previously discussed by Hudson, the parties in Iraq have not yet been able to 
have stable coalitions. Concessions and compromises seem to be a farfetched notion for 
the Iraqis. These factors are enough to have a failed consociational model if tried in 
Iraq. Lebanon is the most prominent examples of this model, where the different sects 
are still fighting, even if only, politically leaving the country in a stalemate.  
 
As for federalism, the case study of Iraq has show that step by step, it might prove to be 
the solution for all the turmoil Iraq is going through. The checks and balances 
80 
 
embedded in the federal model are perfect for the ethnicities/sects to guarantee their 
rights in the face of each other. The bicameralism of the federal model is also very 
important for this process since the different groups will make sure their rights are being 
preserved. As long as the different ethnic and secterian fears are satisfied, the way to 
democracy in peace in Iraq will have a bright future. Their fears should be dealt with the 
four variables in this study as highlighted.  
 
The four variables under study for the stability of Iraq are security, nationalism, 
ethnicity/sectarianism and distribution of wealth. These variables are important in 
examining the federal governing model of Iraq since it has been a formerly authoritarian 
country repressed by one hegemon. The fears of the different ethnic groups can only be 
viewed from the four variables at hand for the stability of the country will be at stake if 
any of them is missing.  
 
Security has different branches since it tackles the security of the country against 
various insurgencies or the security of the different groups against each other.  
 
While nationalism on the other hand would unite the different ethnic groups on the basis 
of the importance of having an Iraq where they will all live side by side, the 
ethnic/secterian problem poses itself as a counter to it. Ethnicities should be protected 
against each other by catering to their different needs.  
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Distribution of wealth is also interrelated to all the other three since the wealth of Iraq is 
concentrated in various geographical places. This is not engineered correctly would 
leave some governorates wealthier than the others and it would lead to instability or 
even a civil war.  
 
Federalism is the basis of this protection since it is the theory of integration where it 
might be the solution to channel the ethnic/secterian problem to a nationalistic 
approach. The guaranteed division of power can help decrease the posed problem since 
the power structure will not centralized in the hand of one government. 
 
This paper has also underlines the challenges facing federalism in Iraq. The first 
challenge as discussed earlier is the fact that the Kurds have more veto power than the 
others. If this problem is not leveraged in a better way, it will create greater tensions 
than the ones already existing. Furthermore, the ambiguity of the constitution set for 
Iraq can be a great challenge for the Iraqis since they have not been exposed to any kind 
of democracy prior to 2003.  
 
Bicameralism of this model, however, protects the various groups as it would be a dual 
representation. As, also, mentioned earlier in this chapter, the political and social 
structures of any country are a direct link to stability. (Lijphart 1969, 208) 
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The election outcomes between 2005 and 2010 prove the need for Iraq to find their 
common grounds. The change of rhetoric is very important since it has shown Iraqi’s 
belief in a secular candidate ―Iyad Allawi‖ in the face of other more religious 
candidates. After the mini-civil war of 2005-2007, the Iraqis have all shifted towards a 
more neutral position, though it might only be on the surface. This is all due to the 
ability of the federal model in trying to undermine the religious and ethnic differences 
by protecting all parties in its components. As highlighted earlier, the system was not 
the reason behind the tensions; the main cause is Iraqi’s inexperience with such a 
system.  
 
The foreign policies of the three countries this study has tackled are also very important 
in tackling the future of Iraq. Iraq does not exist in vacuum and it has a big role in 
Middle Eastern affairs. If the Iraqis succeed in gaining and keeping of good relations 
with Iran, Syria and Turkey, it will be helping itself towards a peaceful Iraq. These four 
countries share common interests in regards to security and their ethnic/secterian 
problems. A final solution would indefinitely involve the four countries together. It is of 
interest to all Iran, Syria and Turkey to maintain a stable and unified, even if federal, 
Iraq. Iraq’s stability has a huge effect on its neighboring countries.  
 
After studying different aspects of the federal model in regards to the four variables of 
this study (ethnicity/sectarianism, nationalism, security and distribution of wealth), in 
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addition to the foreign policies of its three neighbors, federalism is the most viable 
solution for the multi-ethnic/ multi-secterian deeply divided country like Iraq. Given 
their lack of experience with the concept of democracy, federalism can be the ideology 
which can organize the political like in Iraq due to its fluctuating traits and especially 
integration of various groups into the political system. If any other governing models 
studied in this paper are applied, secession seems to be gleaming from afar for a Iraq. 
The creation of three countries instead of one would not be in the interest of the Iraqis 
themselves and to all their neighboring countries.   
 
The path to democracy is very hard and bloody road. It cannot be achieved over-night 
and it has an ugly face. The bloodshed in Iraq has been decreasing with the years and 
the insurgency is losing their grounds. The positivity of the case of Iraq is the existence 
of a basis which might present the solution. The common belief that democracy should 
be done by the people and not imposed can be seen in the Arab Spring invading Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya and Syria. Though these countries people have started the revolution 
against their oppressors, it did not exclude bloodshed and until this day, no real 
governance model has been proposed to organize the political and social life of the 
countries that have toppled their regimes.  
 
As discussed, the domino effect in Iraq’s struggle towards organizing their political life 
and maintaining peace has spread towards moving beyond authoritarian regimes and 
achieving more democratic regimes that serve their populations. However, the case of 
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Iraq has pushed the other countries to seek democracy without the meddling of any 
other foreign country in their internal affairs. 
 
The future map of the Middle East is redrawing itself while ethnicities and sects are 
trying to unite themselves along the whole Middle Eastern lines. Nationalism has 
changed its original meaning to become the patriotism towards one’s ethnicity or sect 
and not towards a country by itself. Iraq’s future can only be a fruitful one if 
nationalism is reintroduced and is the base of the formation of one Iraq under which all 
the ethnicities have equal rights. History is being made with all the changes happening 
around the Arabs at the moment. The end of it does not seem clear though a lot of 
speculations have been made.  
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